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Case No. 20130432-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of controlled substance 
possession, third degree felonies, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(b)(ii); and one 
count each of possession of drug paraphernalia, Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5; and 
driving with a controlled substance in the body, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-517; 
both class B misdemeanors. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2014) . 
INTRODUCTION 
After stopping Defendant for a license plate violation, a highly-trained 
and experienced UHP Trooper observed that Defendant's fast and jittery speech 
and movements were inconsistent with typical nervousness and more likely 
explained by controlled substance use. The Trooper also learned that 
Defendant had a history of drug possession. Based on these facts, the Trooper 
conducted field sobriety tests which Defendant failed. The Trooper discovered 
drugs, paraphernalia, and knives in Defendant's car and THC metabolite in 
Defendant's blood. Trial counsel unsuccessfully moved to suppress this 
evidence. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in litigating that 
motion. 
During jury selection, the trial court questioned individual jurors in 
chambers without Defendant. Defendant argues that his counsel should have 
objected to this procedure and should have removed three jurors, including a 
retired highway patrol trooper. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was trial counsel ineffective during jury selection? 
2. Was trial counsel ineffective in litigating the motion to suppress? 
Standard of Review for issues 1-2. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
initially raised on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Beckering, 2015 UT 
App 53, 118, 346 P.3d 672. 
3. After trial, the trial court sua sponte raised issues of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel and appointed Defendant conflict counsel to address 
them. Conflict counsel filed a document captioned "Amicus Brief," arguing 
that trial counsel performed adequately. 
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Did the trial court plainly err m appointing conflict counsel for 
, Defendant? 
" 
Standard of Review. Plain error is obvious, prejudicial error. See id. ,I19. 
4. The trial court entered Defendant's conviction on Count II as a 
third degree felony even though the prosecutor had amended Count II to a class 
B misdemeanor. 
Should this Court remand to allow the trial court to correct this clerical 
error? 
Standard of Review. None applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No interpretation of any constitutional provision, statute, or rule is 
required. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Facts. 
UHP Trooper John Sheets stopped Defendant's car on I-15 after noticing 
that Defendant's California license plate was missing a required sticker 
showing the registration month. R436:3-4;R440:43-45; State's Exhibit (SE) #7. 
The car's registration, which was valid, also showed that the year sticker on 
Defendant's plate was invalid. R436:6-8. For identification, Defendant could 
produce only an expired Colorado driver's license. R436:6-8. 
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While discussing Defendant's license and registration, Sheets observed 
that Defendant was "a little bit jittery," "had jittery ... fast speech," and was 
"bouncing around a little bit." R436:8-9. In Sheets' experience of having 
stopped "thousands of cars," Defendant's behavior was inconsistent with 
typical "nervousness." R436:9. Rather, it suggested that Defendant "was on 
some type of stimulant." R436:8-9;R440:56. 
When he stopped Defendant in June 2010, Sheets had been an officer for 
about 20 years and on UHP's drug interdiction squad for about 9 years. R436:2. 
Sheets had taken several classes on drug recognition, and had been a certified 
Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) for about 6 years, and a certified DRE instructor 
for about 4 years. R436:2,13. 
Sheets returned to his car to check Defendant's license, registration, and 
criminal history. R436:8. He learned that the car had been properly registered 
to Defendant about three months earlier and that Defendant had been issued a 
valid Utah driver's license. R436:6,8. He also learned that Defendant had a 
history of drug offenses. R436:8;R440:48-49. Defendant had a 2001 charge for 
conh·olled substance possession; a felony conviction for controlled substance 
possession entered later in 2001; a 2006 felony charge for controlled substance 
possession; and a 2007 probation violation for again possessing controlled 
-4-
1 
• 
' 
• 
I 
substances. R460:3-5. This history "heightened" Sheets' "suspicions" that 
, Defendant was under the influence of drugs. R436:8. 
, 
" 
Sheets administered field sobriety tests which Defendant failed. R436:12-
15. On the eye gaze test, Defendant demonstrated a "lack of convergence in 
both eyes," which suggested marijuana use. R436:12;R440:58-60. Defendant 
demonstrated a " [ o ]ne inch . . . sway" on the Rhomberg test. R436:13. 
Defendant also demonstrated "eyelid tremors," which indicates "drug use." 
R436:14. On the walk and turn test, Defendant raised his arms on his third step 
and did not turn properly. R436:14. On the one-leg stand test, Defendant had a 
"swaying balance." R436:14. Defendant's pulse was elevated and he also had 
"red eyed conjunctiva," which indicates marijuana use. R436:14. 
Before administering these tests, Sheets asked Defendant if he had any 
weapons; Defendant replied that he had two knives. R436:9-11. Because 
Defendant had a felony conviction, Sheets concluded that Defendant could not 
possess the knives. R436:9-10,15. 
Sheets arrested Defendant based on the field sobriety tests and his 
possessing the knives. R436:14-15. Sheets searched Defendant's car and found: 
(a) two knives; (b) a hand grenade-shaped n1arijuana grinder that smelled of 
raw marijuana and had greenish residue; (c) a hand grenade-shaped lighter; ( d) 
a "bindle" of methamphetamine; (e) three cellophane-wrapped hydrocodone or 
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Lortab pills; (f) seven cellophane-wrapped prescription anti-seizure medication 
pills; (g) two glass pipes, one with burnt residue; (h) a safety pin with residue; 
and (i) three empty "twists" made from plastic bag pieces with burned ends 
which resembled typical drug packaging. R435:6-11;R436:18-19;R440:66-83. 
Defendant refused to submit to a urine test because he admitted having 
smoked marijuana. R436:21. He claimed to have a California "medical 
marijuana card." R436:29;R440:90. Sheets obtained a warrant for a blood draw. 
R436:23. Defendant's blood tested positive for a tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 
metabolite, marijuana's primary metabolite. R440:89; SE #3. 
Defendant admits using marijuana 
At trial, Defendant admitted using marijuana in California two days 
before the stop. R440:134. He also admitted that the marijuana grinder and 
lighter were his. R440:137,143. Defendant claimed he had obtained a California 
medical marijuana permit after injuring his back. R440:131-33,137. 
Defendant also admitted that the knives were his. R440:143. He said he 
used them at his job to cut open pallets of cardboard. R440:145. 
Defendant claimed to know nothing about the other drugs and 
paraphernalia in his car. R440:137-38,143-44. He said that he purchased the car 
"[a]bout" a month before the stop but had never cleaned it. R440:138,142. He 
said he registered the car "about a couple of days" after buying it. R44O:143. 
-6-
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Defendant actually registered his car in March 2010, three months before the 
stop. R440:148. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with: 
Count I- possession of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony; 
Count II- possession of hydrocodone, a third degree felony; 
Count III- possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, a class A misdemeanor; 
Count IV - driving with a measurable controlled substance in 
the body, a class B misdemeanor; 
Count V -possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor; and 
Count VI-possession of a controlled substance without a 
valid prescription, a class B misdemeanor. 
R2-1. At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor moved to amend Count 
II (hydrocodone possession) to a class B misdemeanor after Trooper Sheets 
testified that the hydrocodone pills were Lortab, a schedule III substance. 
R2,27;R435:10. The trial court granted the motion. 1 R2,27;R435:10. The State 
dismissed Count VI before trial. R147. 
1 Before the preliminary hearing, the State filed an amended information 
correcting Defendant's last name, but not changing the original charges. Rl2-
11. The trial court a1nended Count II to a class B misdemeanor only on the 
original Information. R2, 12. 
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At his arraignment, Defendant initially pied guilty to Count I 
(methamphetamine possession), but when his counsel interjected, Defendant 
changed his plea to not guilty on all charges. R435:24. 
The motion to suppress 
Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his car 
and blood, arguing that the initial search violated his constitutional rights. R33-
32. No memorandum accompanied the motion. The trial court held a hearing 
on the motion and Trooper Sheets testified and was cross-examined. 
R35;R436:l-37. Trial counsel had not requested, and therefore had not 
reviewed, Sheets' dash-cam video before the hearing. R436:34-35. The trial 
court therefore did not review that video during the hearing. R436:34-35. 
Following the hearing, the trial court set a briefing schedule on the 
motion. R35. Trial counsel never filed a supporting memorandum, despite 
requesting and receiving an extension to do so. R40-37. The State filed a 
memorandum opposing the motion. R56-41. The trial court denied the motion 
without explanation. R57. 
Trial counsel moved to set aside that order and for additional time to file 
a supporting 1nemorandmn. R83. The trial court granted the request. R83. 
Rather than filing a memorandum, however, trial counsel filed a transcript of 
the preliminary hearing and a notice to submit the suppression motion for 
-8-
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decision. R82-57,85. The trial court thereafter reinstated its prior order denying 
the suppression motion, noting that Defendant had never filed a supporting 
memorandum. R86. 
Two days before trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss, arguing that the 
dash-cam video demonstrated that there was "no basis" for the stop. R143. 
According to him, the video showed that Sheets did not inspect Defendant's 
license plate until after stopping him. R143-42. The trial court denied the 
motion. R440:124-25. 
The trial 
Jurors Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra, and Lucy Jones were questioned 
in chambers and sat on the jury. Br.Aplt. 29-30. Defendant was not present 
during the in-chambers questioning. R431,428. The argument section below 
contains additional detail about jury selection. 
The jury convicted Defendant of Counts I, II, IV, and V. R263-
58;R440:206-07. The jury acquitted on Count III (dangerous weapon 
possession). R263-58;R440:206-07. 
Post-trial proceedings 
After trial, the trial court notified the parties that it was sua sponte 
considering granting a new trial based on trial counsel's possible ineffective 
assistance. R268-67. The court was concerned that trial counsel did not (1) "file 
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any memorandum following an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress"; or (2) 11 challenge or remove a potentially biased juror." R268. 
Although the court stated that the trial testimony presented II at least an 
arguable basis to have pursued defendant's motion to suppress," the court did 
not identify any specific testimony. R268. On the juror issue, the court 
expressed concern that trial counsel did not remove a former highway 
patrolman. R268. The court identified no concern with any other juror. R268. 
The court later withdrew the jury selection issue. R285 n.l;R441:2;442:4,7-8. 
After appointing Defendant conflict counsel and receiving a 
memorandum from that attorney, the trial court withdrew its remaining 
concern about litigation of the suppression motion. R274,286-78;R441:6;R442:8-
9. 
The trial court sentenced Defendant to 0-5 years in prison on Counts I 
and II, and 6 months in jail on Counts IV and V, all to run concurrently. 
R442:13-14. The trial court suspended those sentences and placed Defendant on 
24 months' probation on several conditions, including that he serve 30 days in 
jail with credit for 15 days served and pay various fines and fees. R295-
93;R442:13-14. The court stayed the sentence pending a new h·ial motion. 
R442:16. 
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Trial counsel filed a motion for new trial arguing that Trooper Sheets 
changed his testimony about the reason for the stop. R297-96;R393;R443:l. The 
motion did not specify how the testimony changed, but rather included 
unofficial transcripts of the preliminary hearing, suppression hearing, and trial. 
R360-296. 
At the new trial motion hearing, trial counsel argued that Trooper Sheets 
conducted a "profile stop" and did not discover the license plate violation until 
after the stop. R443:4. The trial court denied the motion without elaborating. 
R394. Defendant timely appeals. R396. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective during jury voir dire 
because he did not: (1) ensure that Defendant was present during in-chambers 
questioning of individual prospective jurors; and (2) remove Jurors Mangelson, 
Jones, and Sachra. Defendant's claims fail out the outset because he relies on 
the wrong prejudice standard. Defendant does not assert that a biased juror 
actually sat. 
Defendant does argue that Juror Sachra expressed bias, but he has not 
shown that her single, equivocal statement that a person who has drugs in their 
car "is probably guilty," established actual bias. Nor has Defendant shown that 
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follow-up questioning did not dispel any potential bias. The jury's acquittal on 
count III also demonstrates that no juror was actually biased. 
Alternatively, Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that 
his counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic. The record of the in-
chambers questioning is inaudible. Defendant attempted to reconstruct the 
record with declarations from his trial counsel and the prosecutor. But he 
provides no declaration himself. The record that he does provide does not 
rebut the presumption of effective assistance. 
Defendant provides no non-speculative evidence that he and his counsel 
did not discuss the in-chambers questioning or that Defendant did not waive 
his presence. Counsel's inability to recall such discussions does not establish 
that the discussions and waiver did not occur. 
Nor has Defendant rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel's 
jury selection decisions were strategic. He has not shown that his counsel was 
inattentive or indifferent to any juror, or that a juror expressed bias so strongly 
that all reasonable attorneys would have removed that juror. Juror Sachra did 
not express actual bias. And Defendant has not shown that Juror Jones' alleged 
reservations about serving as a juror related to potential bias, as opposed to 
concerns about her health or employment. 
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Nor has Defendant shown that his counsel lacked any plausible reason 
for keeping Juror Mangelson. Although Juror Mangelson was a retired 
highway patrol trooper, he unequivocally affirmed that he would not give 
Trooper Sheets' testimony more weight and that he would decide the case 
based on the evidence and the law. Trial counsel had also worked with Juror 
Mangelson when counsel was a prosecutor, and counsel believed that Juror 
Mangelson would be sympathetic to Defendant based on what he perceived to 
be Trooper Sheets' questionable tactics. This was a legitimate reason not to 
remove Juror Mangelson that arguably proved partially successful, because the 
jury acquitted Defendant on one count. 
II. Defendant faults his trial counsel for not raising additional arguments 
in the suppression motion. Defendant now asserts that Trooper Sheets lacked 
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop because: (1) the dash-cam video of the 
stop refuted Sheets' observations of Defendant's speech and manner; (2) 
Defendant's criminal history of controlled substance possession was too stale; 
and (3) Sheets' trial testimony undermined his suppression hearing testimony. 
Trooper Sheets was a highly-trained and experienced Drug Recognition 
Expert who observed that Defendant's speech and behavior was fast and jittery 
and not typical of normal nervousness. He also he learned that Defendant had 
long a history of controlled substance possession. Defendant also could not 
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produce a valid driver's license. The constellation of these factors established 
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. 
The dash-cam video does not refute Sheets' observations because, in the 
less-than-two minute portion capturing Defendant's initial interactions with 
Sheets, Defendant's speech and movements are mostly indiscernible. 
Defendant's behavior outside the car is largely irrelevant because it occurs after 
Sheets decided to extend the stop, and it is not necessarily indicative of 
Defendant's earlier behavior. In any event, Defendant failed the field sobriety 
tests. 
Nor is Defendant's criminal history too stale to support reasonable 
suspicion. Defendant's criminal history showed a long and recurring pattern of 
controlled substance possession. 
Finally, although Defendant alleges that Sheets' testimony materially 
changed between the suppression hearing and trial, trial counsel could not have 
relied on that fact in litigating a pre-trial motion to suppress. Regardless, there 
is no material difference between descriptions of Defendant's speech as "fast" 
and "jittery," and "rapid." Ad while Sheets' testimony about how he first 
encountered Defendant's car changed from the suppression hearing to the trial, 
that change would affect only the validity of the initial stop, which Defendant 
does not challenge. 
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III. Defendant argues that when the trial court sua sponte raised issues 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it plainly erred by not appointing 
independent, conflict counsel to represent Defendant. But that is exactly what 
the trial court did. The fact that conflict counsel viewed himself as only a friend 
to the court is an issue of counsel, not trial court error. Regardless, Defendant 
could not show that his conflict counsel was ineffective because he has not 
shown that conflict counsel could have proven that his trial counsel was 
ineffective. 
IV. Defendant's sentence contains a clerical error because it records his 
conviction on Count II (hydrocodone possession) as a third degree felony, even 
though the prosecutor had amended that charge to a class B misdemeanor. 
Clerical errors are correctable at any time. This Court should thus remand for 
the limited purpose of correcting the error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT REBUTTED THE STRONG PRESUMPTION THAT 
HIS COUNSEL PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY DURING JURY SELECTION 
During jury selection, the trial court and counsel individually questioned 
several potential jurors in chambers. R416-412,431-28. Defendant argues that 
because he was "not allowed to attend or to participate" in this in-cha1nbers 
questioning, he was "denied the opportunity to be present at a critical stage" of 
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his trial. Br.Aplt. 16-17. Because he did not raise this issue below, Defendant 
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not insisting that Defendant be 
present. Br.Aplt. 17, 21. Defendant further contends that his counsel was 
ineffective for not removing three jurors who were questioned in chambers. 
Br.Aplt. 21-37. 
After the prospective jurors completed a questionnaire, the trial court 
questioned them in open court. R189,461;R440:1-21. The court then explained 
that it would "meet with counsel in my chambers" to question prospective 
jurors individually. R440:21. 
The trial court questioned several jurors in chambers. R416-412,431-28. 
The record of the in-chambers questioning is unintelligible, however, because 
the courtroom microphone was left on during the questioning. R440:22. After 
the in-chambers questioning, counsel passed the panel for cause and made 
peremptory challenges in open court. R412,431;R440:22-24. 
In light of the missing record, Defendant obtained "declarations" from 
his trial counsel and the prosecutor. R417-08,432-24. These were prepared over 
fifteen 1nonths after trial. R424(a),410. Trial counsel's declaration states that 
Defendant was not present during the in-chambers questioning and "was not 
invited in chambers." R431,428. Defendant concedes that his "counsel failed to 
object" to Defendant's absence. Br.Aplt. 17. 
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Jurors Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra, and Lucy Jones were questioned 
in chambers and sat on the jury. Br.Aplt. 29-30. Juror Mangelson was a retired 
highway patrol trooper that trial counsel had worked with when counsel was 
the Juab County attorney. R430-29. Juror Mangelson said that he would base 
his decision solely on the evidence and the law as instructed by the trial court 
and that he knew of nothing that would prevent him from being fair and 
impartial. R430,461:Questionnaire 2. 
The prosecutor recalled Juror Sachra saying that "if a person had drugs in 
the car, they were probably guilty." R415. Although neither declaration from 
counsel details any specific follow-up questions to her, the prosecutor could 
"not recall any discussion about striking her for cause." R415. Juror Sachra 
said that she would "try" her "best" to base her decision on the evidence and 
the law and" to put strong feelings aside." R461:Questionnaire 3. 
When Juror Jones was asked "whether she could be fair and impartial," 
she expressed "reservations about her ability to function as a juror." R429. She 
was 68 and worked at an elementary school. R461:Questionnaire 13. When the 
trial court repeated the question, Jones "replied that she understood what the 
judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror." R429. Jones also 
said she would base her decision solely on the evidence and the law and knew 
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of nothing that would prevent her from being fair and impartial. 
R461:Questionnaire 13. 
A. This Court must presume that trial counsel's jury selection 
decisions were strategic and therefore effective. 
To prove that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, Defendant bears the "heavy burden" of showing both that 
his counsel's performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a 
result. State v. Stidham, 2014 UT App 32, ill8, 320 P.3d 696 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). To be deficient, counsel's performance 
must "f[a]ll below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 688. Reasonableness is measured by the "prevailing professional norms." 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 
Showing that counsel's performance during jury selection was objectively 
unreasonable is especially difficult because a Defendant must rebut several 
presumptions. Strickland mandates "a strong presumption" that all of counsel's 
actions are reasonably based on "sound trial strategy." 466 U.S. at 689 
(quotation and citation omitted). Thus, to show deficient performance in any 
context, a defendant must prove that "there was no conceivable tactical basis" for 
his counsel's actions. State ·v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
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This is especially difficult to do in the jury selection context because "jury 
selection is a highly selective, judgmental, an intuitive process" that is "more art 
than science." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r,r20-21, 12 P.3d 92. Defense 
counsel "clearly have the right to identify and prefer particular jurors without 
regard to any particular objective criterion or philosophy of jury selection." Id. 
if23. This discretion includes the ability to make decisions based on a 
prospective juror's "demeanor, interaction with others in the courtroom, and 
personality in general," or even on the nature of the juror's "eye contact" with 
the attorney. Id. ,r21. 
Given the highly subjective nature of jury selection, "the Strickland 
standard requires the appellate court to make two distinct presumptions" in 
addition to Strickland's general presumption of strategic, reasonable 
performance. Id. if 20. First, a court must presume that "trial counsel's lack of 
objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror is ... the product of a 
conscious choice or preference." Id. Second, "trial counsel's presumably 
conscious and strategic choice to refrain from removing a particular juror is 
further presumed to constitute effective representation." Id. 
Finally, in addition to these presumptions, this Court must "presume that 
any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant 
evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at if17. This presumption 
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arises because Defendant bears the burden to provide a record that 
affirmatively rebuts the Strickland/ Litherland presumptions of strategic, effective 
performance. See id. ,J,Jl6-17. 
Because Defendant bears the burden of proof, "[i]t should go without 
saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the 'strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance."' Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013). Thus, if "the record appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom 
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,Jl7. 
B. Defendant relies on the wrong prejudice standard. 
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective during jury 
selection, because Defendant analyzes his argument under the wrong prejudice 
standard. Although a defendant must prove both Strickland elements, a 
reviewing court need not address both "if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Because he relies on the wrong 
standard, Defendant has not shown prejudice. This Court may therefore affirm 
on that ground alone. See id. (court can reject ineffectiveness claim based on 
lack of prejudice alone). 
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To prove Strickland prejudice, a defendant must ordinarily demonstrate 
" that the alleged deficient performance "affected the outcome of the case." 
" 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 119. But that is not the standard for proving 
ineffectiveness during jury selection. In State v. King, 2008 UT 54, 1115-36, 190 
P.3d 1283, the Utah Supreme Court held that to prevail on a claim that counsel 
was ineffective during jury selection, a defendant "must show that his counsel's 
actions ... allowed the seating of an actually biased juror." Thus, to prevail 
here, Defendant must show that at least one of his jurors was actually biased. 
See id.; see also State v. Sessions, 2014 UT 44, i131, 342 P.3d 738 (showing of 
'" actual juror bias'" required to prove ineffective assistance for lacking neutral 
" ground for peremptory challenge); State v. Arriaga, 2012 UT App 295, il13, 288 
P.3d 588 (counsel's deficient performance during jury selection prejudicial only 
if biased juror sat). 
" 
Showing "actual bias," of course, requires more than merely showing 
potential or even presumptive bias. See King, 2008 UT 54, ilil30-39. As the 
supreme court recognized, "stretching . . . the bounds of jury bias error" to 
include only "possible juror bias" would be "illogical" and "lead to perverse 
results." Id. ,I18. Thus, even though two jurors in King had "made disclosures 
that suggested potential bias," King could not show Strickland prejudice 
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without showing that his counsel's failure to remove the jurors "allowed the 
seating of an actually biased juror." Id. at ifif19, 47 (emphasis added). 
Defendant begrudgingly acknowledges that he is "forced" to challenge 
the selection of his jury under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. 
Br.Aplt. 34. But he refuses to acknowledge the correct prejudice analysis. 
Defendant argues that to show prejudice he "must show 'a reasonable 
probability' that with the effective assistance of counsel, the jury would have 
had 'a reasonable doubt respecting guilt."' Br.Aplt. 34 ( quoting State v. Hales, 
2007 UT 14, ,r,rs6, 92-93, 152 P.3d 321). Defendant later asserts that the 
"question here is whether there was at least a reasonable probability of a 
different result had [he] been allowed to participate in jury voir dire and 
selection." Br.Aplt. 37. 
As explained, however, the correct standard requires a showing that 
"counsel's actions . .. allowed the seating of an actually biased juror." King, 2008 
UT 54, if 47 (emphasis added). Defendant cites King to support his claim that 
one juror expressed bias. Br.Aplt. 36. But he does not acknowledge King's 
holding that prejudice in this context requires a showing of actual bias. Br.Aplt. 
36. Because Defendant fails to analyze his claim under the correct prejudice 
standard, this Court should reject it on this ground alone. 
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1. Defendant has not shown that any juror was actually biased. 
Despite his failure to analyze his ineffectiveness claim under the correct 
standard, Defendant does argue that Juror Sachra, "revealed a strong bias or 
impression." Br.Aplt. 35. But the only evidence of bias that Defendant cites to 
support this assertion is the prosecutor's recollection that during in-chambers 
questioning, Juror Sachra stated that "if a person had drugs in the car, they 
were probably guilty." Br.Aplt. 35 (quoting R415). Even assuming that this 
amounts to an argument that Juror Sachra was actually biased, Defendant has 
not made that showing. 
As noted, the declarations of Defendant's trial counsel and the prosecutor 
are the only record of the in-chambers questioning. R432-24,417-08. 
Defendant's trial counsel recalled that Juror Sachra was questioned in 
chambers, but could not recall any details about that questioning. R430,428. 
The prosecutor recalled that Juror Sachra said she had been a victim of rape, 
that her son had been prosecuted in California for drugs, and that "she was 
against drugs." R415. The prosecutor also recalled Juror Sachra saying "that if 
a person had drugs in the car, they were probably guilty." R415. The record 
contains no other details about Juror Sachra' s individual questioning. 
Her questionnaire reveals that she was 71 years old. R461:Questionnaire 
3. When asked whether she would "be able and willing to make [her] decision 
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solely based on the evidence presented at trial" she wrote, "I would try." Id. 
She also wrote that she would "do [her] best" "to follow the judge's instruction" 
on the law even if she believed otherwise. Id. Finally, when asked, whether 
there were any reason she "could not be an impartial and fair juror" she 
responded, "I would do my best to put strong feelings aside." Id. 
Juror Sachra' s single statement that someone with drugs in their car is 
"probably guilty" does not show actual bias. First, the statement was equivocal. 
Second, Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that his counsel 
strategically, and therefore effectively chose to leave Juror Sachra on the jury 
because any potential for bias was dispelled by further questioning. Finally, the 
jury's split verdict demonstrates that no juror was actually biased against 
Defendant. 
a. Juror Sachra's single equivocal statement does not show 
actual bias. 
Juror Sachra' s single, equivocal statement does not show actual bias. The 
juror said only that a person who had drugs in their car was "probably guilty." 
R415 (emphasis added). Far from showing actual bias, such a statement reveals 
only a common-sense conclusion likely shared by the overwhelming majority of 
people. 
The statement was also equivocal. Juror Sachra did not say that everyone 
who is caught with drugs in their car was necessarily guilty. Rather, she said 
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only that they were "probably guilty." R415. Thus, Juror Sachra's statement 
did not establish that she was unwilling to base her ultimate decision on the 
facts and the law. On the contrary, that was something she said she would 
"try" her "best" to do. R461:Questionnaire 3. That uncontradicted statement 
from her questionnaire-unlike the prosecutor's recollection of her statement 
during individual questioning-was unequivocal. R461:Questionnaire 3. Thus, 
Defendant has not shown that Juror Sachra' s equivocal statement demonstrates 
actual bias. 
b. Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that follow-
up questioning dispelled any potential bias. 
Second, Defendant has not proven that follow-up questioning did not 
dispel any potential bias. Because Juror Sachra sat, this Court must presume 
that counsel strategically decided to keep her on the jury because any potential 
prejudice she exhibited was dispelled to counsel's satisfaction. See Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, ,I,Il7, 20. 
Defendant provides no evidence that any potential bias Juror Sachra may 
have exhibited was not dispelled through follow-up questioning. On the 
contrary, the available record demonstrates, or at least does not rebut, the 
strong presumption that follow-up questioning dispelled any potential bias. 
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The trial court questioned each juror brought into chambers about their 
ability to be impartial. After allowing counsel to question the individual jurors, 
the trial court asked each "juror if he or she could be fair and impartial." R431. 
True, the available record does not show how Juror Sachra answered this 
question. . But the record supports the presumption that she answered it 
affirmatively for two reasons. First, an affirmative answer would have been 
consistent with her answers in her questionnaire that she would "try" her 
"best" to decide the case based on the law and the evidence presented at trial. 
R461:Questionnaire 3. 
Second, neither side moved to strike her for cause even though, after 
questioning each juror, the trial court asked whether either side desired to strike 
that juror for cause. R431,416,412. The prosecutor recalled that if a juror had 
answered in a manner indicating bias, he would have moved to strike that 
juror. R415. The parties' and the trial court's failure to strike Juror Sachra 
support the inference that she was not actually biased. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 
U.S. 1, 18 (2007) (inferring that "the interested parties present in the court room 
all felt that removing" a juror "was appropriate" based on the parties' and trial 
court's actions). 
The record also demonstrates, or at least does not rebut, the strong 
presumption that had Juror Sachra expressed potential bias, the attorneys 
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would have asked her follow-up questions to probe the extent of that potential 
bias. The available record shows that both counsel followed up with other 
prospective jurors who revealed potential bias. R431,416. Defense counsel 
recalled asking follow-up questions of prospective jurors Sperry and 
Richardson. R429-28. The prosecutor recalled posing follow-up questions to 
prospective jurors Laird, Jones, and Wood. R413. The record thus supports the 
presumption that Juror Sachra was asked any necessary follow-up questions 
and answered them to everyone's satisfaction. 
A single statement that a juror believes a defendant is "probably" guilty 
is not enough to establish actual bias when follow-up questioning dispels any 
potential bias. For example, in State v. Hughes, 691 S.E.2d 813, 824 (W. Va. 2010), 
a juror unequivocally answered "Yes" when asked whether she believed that 
"when someone is charged, they're more likely than not to be guilty." But in 
follow-up questioning, the juror explained her understanding that an arrest 
warrant could issue only after a magistrate had made a probable cause finding. 
Id. Hughes argued that the trial court erroneously refused to remove the juror 
for cause because her answers revealed actual bias. See id. at 822. The West 
Virginia Supreme Court disagreed, holding "that a prospective juror is not 
subject to removal for cause merely because he/ she affirmatively answered a 
question which, in essence, asked whether the juror believes that a person is 
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arrested or charged because there is probable cause that the person is guilty." 
Id. at 824. 
In so holding, the court noted that at least five other courts had rejected 
claims of actual bias based on prospective juror statements that the defendants 
were "probably" or "more likely than not" guilty. Id. at 823-24; see Ladd v. State, 
3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (follow-up questioning dispelled any 
potential bias where juror said he "leaned" towards believing defendant guilty 
because he had been arrested and indicted); Pressley v. State, 770 So.2d 115, 126-
27 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (follow-up questioning dispelled any potential bias 
where juror said defendant was "probably guilty" because he had been 
charged); Raulerson v. State, 491 S.E.2d 791, 799 (Ga. 1997) (same); Commonwealth 
v. Sweeney, 347 A.2d 286, 288 (Pa. 1975) (follow-up questioning dispelled any 
potential bias where jurors said defendant "was more likely than not" guilty 
because he was arrested); Cressell v. Commonwealth, 531 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Va. App. 
2000) (follow-up questioning dispelled any potential bias where juror said 
defendant was "probably guilty of something" because he was on h·ial). 
Quoting State v. Saunders, Defendant argues that "a bare assertion 
suggesting rehabilitation 'is not sufficient'" where a juror has expressed 
potential bias. Br.Aplt. 31 (quoting State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, if36, 992 P.2d 
951). But Saunders involved a preserved challenge to the trial court's refusal to 
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allow counsel to ask follow-up questions of jurors who indicated possible bias, 
not an argument that trial counsel was ineffective for not removing particular 
jurors. See 1999 UT 59, i-132. Thus, while it is true that a juror's assurances of 
impartiality may be insufficient to show that a trial court did not err in refusing 
to strike that juror for cause, that principle is inapplicable to a claim that 
counsel was ineffective for not removing a juror. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, i-120 
(reviewing courts must presume counsel's jury selection decisions are strategic 
and therefore effective). 
Finally, the fact that the trial court did not raise any post-trial concerns 
about Juror Sachra supports the presumption that she was not actually biased. 
Although the trial court sua sponte raised a concern with trial counsel's 
performance during jury selection, that concern involved only counsel's 
decision to leave Juror Mangelson on the jury, not Juror Sachra. R268. The trial 
court raised its concern just one week after trial. R268. The trial court's 
omission of any concern about Juror Sachra, even though the jury selection 
proceedings would have been fresh on the court's mind, supports the 
presumption that Juror Sachra was not actually biased. Defendant has not 
rebutted that presumption. 
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c. The jury's split verdict shows that no juror was actually 
biased. 
Finally, the jury's split verdict shows that no juror was actually biased. 
Although the jury convicted Defendant of drug and paraphernalia possession, 
and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, it acquitted 
him of possessing a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. R263-
58;R440:206-08. The jury did so even though Defendant admitted that the two 
knives in his car were his, and even though the jury convicted him of 
possessing a Schedule II controlled substance, which necessarily made him a 
Category II restricted person. R259-58;R440:143; see Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (listing Methamphetamine under Schedule II); Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-503(1)(b)(iv) (defining Category II restricted person as person in 
possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance). The jury apparently 
believed Defendant's claim that the knives were not weapons, but merely tools 
that he used at his job. R440:145; see Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501(6)(a)(vi) 
(listing the "lawful purposes for which the object may be used" as a factor for 
evaluating whether object is a dangerous weapon). The jury's split verdict 
therefore demonstrates that it based its verdicts on the evidence, not bias. 
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2. This Court must construe ambiguities and omissions in the 
record in the prosecution's favor. 
Defendant cannot complain that the record is inadequate for him to 
demonstrate actual prejudice. As explained, he has the burden to provide a 
record affirmatively rebutting the strong presumptions of effective assistance in 
jury selection. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if if 17, 20. 
Assuming that Juror Sachra, or any other juror was actually biased, 
Defendant had the means to provide a record showing that bias. Given the 
recording error here, the State stipulated to, and this Court granted, 
Defendant's motion to supplement and correct the record. R407. Defendant 
provided declarations from the prosecutor and his trial counsel. R407,417-24. 
But he chose not to provide declarations from the trial court or from any juror. 
Defendant did not request a hearing to attempt to reconstruct the record. Nor 
did he move for a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
to create a record to support his ineffectiveness claims, even though the 
supreme court has recognized that Rule 23B "offers the most effective method 
to determine" post-trial whether jurors "were actually biased." State v. King, 
2008 UT 54, ifif 41-46, 190 P.3d 1283. 
This Court must presume that the record contains all of the evidence that 
Defendant could marshal in support of his ineffectiveness claim. See Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, if17. As demonstrated, that evidence does not show that Juror 
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Sachra was actually biased. Thus, Defendant has not shown that his counsel 
was ineffective during jury selection. See King, 2008 UT 54, 147. 
C. Alternatively, Defendant has 
presumption that his counsel's 
strategic and therefore effective. 
not rebutted the strong 
jury selection decisions were 
Defendant also has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel 
performed adequately during jury selection and that he strategically decided to 
keep jurors Sachra, Mangelson, and Jones. Defendant asserts that he has 
rebutted this presumption because counsel did not "involve [him] in the voir 
dire proceedings." Br.Aplt. 22. He also contends that he has shown that his 
counsel's jury selection decisions were not strategic because: (1) his counsel was 
"inattentive or indifferent" during jury selection; (2) Juror Sachra expressed 
"unequivocal bias"; and (3) his counsel's choices were "implausible and 
unjustifiable." Br.Aplt. 30-33. 
But the record does not rebut the presumption that counsel adequately 
advised Defendant of his right to participate in the in-chambers questioning 
and that Defendant waived that right. Nor does it rebut the strong 
presumption that counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic. 
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1. Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that his counsel 
advised him of the right to participate in the in-chambers 
questioning and that Defendant waived the right. 
. 
Absent affirmative evidence to the contrary, this Court must presume 
that trial counsel effectively involved Defendant in jury selection. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689 (mandating "a strong presumption" that counsel's decisions are 
strategic); Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r17 (record deficiencies are "construed in 
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively"). Defendant has not 
provided any non-speculative evidence to rebut the presumption that he and 
his counsel discussed his presence during the in-chambers questioning and that 
Defendant waived any right to be present. 
Assuming that Defendant had a right to be present during the in-
chambers questioning, he waived that right by failing to assert it. The "'right 
[to be present at trial] is not absolute and may be waived by word or act of the 
person claiming it."' State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if 34, 48 P.3d 953 ( quoting 
State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1982)). 
In Hubbard, the defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by not 
including him in sidebar discussions between the trial court, prospective jurors, 
and counsel. Id. if31. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that even 
assuming that [Hubbard] possessed a state constitutional and statutory right to 
be present during all discussions with potential jurors, Hubbard waived that 
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right "by failing to assert it." Id. ili-131-34. Relying on United States Supreme 
Court precedent, the Hubbard court held that "a trial court 'need not get an 
express "on the record" waiver from the defendant for every trial conference 
which a defendant may have a right to attend."' Id. i-134 (quoting United States 
v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985)). "A defendant knowing of a discussion 
must assert whatever right he may have to be present." Id. 
Here, the trial court announced in open court that it would question 
individual prospective jurors in chambers. R440:21. There is no evidence that 
Defendant expressed any desire to be present during that portion of jury 
selection. Absent such evidence, this Court must presume that Defendant 
waived any right to be present in chambers. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ili-131-34. 
Defendant argues that he did not waive his right to be present because he 
"was not invited to participate" and "had no notice of his right to attend" the 
in-chambers questioning. Br.Aplt. 19. But Defendant provides no non-
speculative record evidence to support these allegations. 
Defendant has deliberately chosen not to provide his own declaration 
regarding his involvement in jury selection. This Court must therefore presume 
that any information he could have provided would not have supported his 
ineffectiveness claims. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, i-117. 
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Instead, Defendant relies entirely on two sentences from his trial 
counsel's declaration stating: "I do not recall that I had any conversations with 
[Defendant] about any part of the jury selection process. He was not in 
chambers and not involved in the process." Br.Aplt. 19; R428. 
These statements do not prove that Defendant "was not invited to 
participate" and "had no notice of his right to attend" the in-chambers 
questioning. Br.Aplt. 19. Trial counsel's inability to recall discussing whether 
Defendant wished to be present during the in-chambers questioning does not 
establish that such discussions did not happen. This is especially true when 
counsel was attempting to recall events from over fifteen months earlier. 
Defendant merely speculates that he and his counsel did not discuss his 
presence during the in-chambers questioning. But, as explained, ambiguity and 
speculation regarding counsel's performance is inadequate to establish that 
counsel was ineffective. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,17; see also Fernandez v. 
Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)("[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel 
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."). 
Counsel could have reasonably decided to advise Defendant not to attend 
the in-chambers questioning because the jurors would likely be 1nore candid if 
he were not there. See United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1397 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(" doubt[ing] whether the jurors would have been as comfortable discussing 
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their conduct had Bertoli been present."); State v. Alexander, 833 N.W.2d 126, 135 
(Wis. 2013) (recognizing that "jurors may very well have been intimidated and 
deterred from speaking forthrightly about their potential bias with Alexander 
seated only a few feet away"). 
Defendant provides no non-speculative evidence that he and his counsel 
did not discuss the in-chambers questioning and that, based on that discussion, 
Defendant chose to waive any right he had to be present. Nor does Defendant 
provide any evidence of what he would have contributed had he been present, 
or that he would have insisted that his counsel object to the three jurors that his 
appellate counsel now challenges. Defendant thus has not rebutted the strong 
presumption that his counsel adequately involved him in the jury selection 
process and that he waived any right to be present during the in-chambers 
questioning. 
2. Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that his 
counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic. 
Defendant also argues that he has rebutted the strong presumptions that 
his counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic and therefore effective. 
Br.Aplt. 30-33; see Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~20. To rebut these presumptions, 
Defendant must show that either (1) "defense counsel was so inattentive or 
indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure to remove a 
prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice or preference"; (2) 
-36-
• 
• 
' 
• 
' 
' 
"a prospective juror expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible 
countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror"; 
or (3) "some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's choice 
was not plausibly justifiable." Id. Defendant argues that he has made all three 
showings. He has not. 
a. Defendant has not shown that his counsel was inattentive 
or indifferent during jury selection. 
Defendant first argues that his counsel was "inattentive or indifferent" 
during jury selection. Br.Aplt. 30. "To demonstrate actual inattentiveness or 
indifference, defendant must either prove a specific and clear example of 
inattentiveness that directly caused the failure to object to a particular juror, or 
else show that counsel generally failed to participate in a meaningful way in the 
process as a whole." See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 125 n.10. 
Defendant does not contend that his counsel "generally failed to 
participate" in the process. Br.Aplt. 30-33. Nor could he, where the record 
shows that counsel actively participated in questioning prospective jurors and 
exercised all of his pere1nptory strikes. R431-28,416-12. Rather, Defendant 
argues only that his counsel's failure to object to Jurors Sachra and Jones 
provide "specific exarnple[s] of inattentiveness." Br.Aplt. 30-31. 
Defendant argues that his counsel was inattentive to Juror Sachra because 
he did not remove her after "she expressed bias." Br.Aplt. 30. But as explained, 
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she did not express bias and Defendant has not proven that follow-up 
questioning did not dispel any potential bias she may have disclosed. 
As for Juror Jones, Defendant argues that trial counsel was "indifferent" 
to her "reservations about her ability to be fair and impartial." Br.Aplt. 30. In 
his declaration, defense counsel recalled that Juror Jones was "quite reluctant to 
disclose what was going on in her own mind" and that, when asked "whether 
she could be fair and impartial, she had reservations about her ability to 
function as a juror." R429. He also recalled that when the trial court asked a 
second time "whether she could be fair and impartial," she "replied that she 
understood what the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror." 
R429. 
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was inattentive or indifferent 
to Juror Jones. Rather, the fact that he recalled what he perceived to be a 
reluctance to disclose her thoughts demonstrates that he paid attention to her. 
R429. 
Defendant has not shown that Juror Jones' responses were so h·oubling 
that all reasonable attorneys would remove her. Contrary to Defendant's 
representations, the record does not establish that Juror Jones expressed 
reservations "about her ability to be fair and impartial." Br.Aplt. 30. Rather, it 
establishes only that she expressed "reservations about her ability to function as 
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a juror." R429. Those reservations could have stemmed from her age (she was 
68) or her employment (she worked at an elementary school), or some other 
reservation about her personal circumstances unrelated to her impartiality. 
R461:Questionnaire 13. 
The fact that defense counsel recalled that Juror Jones raised her concerns 
in the context of a question about whether she could be fair and impartial does 
not resolve this ambiguity in the record. This is especially true where Juror 
Jones unequivocally declared in her questionnaire that she would base her 
decision solely on the evidence, that she would follow the law as instructed, 
and that she had no reason to feel she "could not be an impartial and fair juror." 
R461:Questionnaire 13. 
Defendant contends that Juror Jones was not successfully rehabilitated. 
Br.Aplt. 31. But again, while that argument may be sufficient to establish error 
in the denial of a for-cause challenge, it is irrelevant in the context of an 
ineffective assistance claim. Under Litherland, defense counsel may reasonably 
decide not to remove a juror even when the juror has expressed potential bias. 
See 2000 UT 76, ,r22. Defendant therefore has not shown that his counsel's 
handling of either Juror Sachra or Jones constitutes a "specific and clear 
example of inattentiveness." See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r2s n.10. 
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b. Defendant has not shown that any juror expressed bias so 
strong that no attorney could reasonably decide not to 
remove that juror. 
Defendant argues that Juror Sachra "expressed the sort of strong, 
unequivocal bias that would cause a reasonable person to second guess 
counsel's actions in failing to remove her." Br.Aplt. 31. Again, the record does 
not support Defendant's contention that Juror Sachra was biased. He therefore 
fails to rebut the Litherland presumptions on this basis. See 2000 UT 76, 120. 
c. Defendant has not shown that his counsel had no 
plausible or justifiable reason for keeping Juror 
Mangelson on the jury. 
Finally, Defendant argues that that there was "no plausible or justifiable 
reason for keeping Uuror] Mangelson on the jury." Br.Aplt. 32. Defendant 
notes that Juror Mangelson was a retired highway patrol trooper who had 
worked in drug interdiction on 1-15 for many years and who knew Trooper 
Sheets. Br.Aplt. 20, 32. 
The record reveals that Juror Mangelson had about 40 years' experience 
as a highway patrolman and had been involved in many jury trials over his 
career. R430,415. Juror Mangelson knew Trooper Sheets, but had not 
supervised him. R415. Although he could not remember "specific questions or 
answers," trial counsel did recall that Juror Mangelson "would have assured us 
that he knew how to be fair, and that he could be fair, if selected as a juror." 
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R430. The prosecutor recalled that defense counsel specifically asked Juror 
Mangelson if he would give Trooper Sheets' testimony more weight, that Juror 
Mangelson said that "he would not," and said that "he would make up his 
mind based on the facts presented in court." R415. 
On his questionnaire, Juror Mangelson wrote that he had been employed 
by a law enforcement agency. R461:Questionnaire 2. He also unequivocally 
affirmed that he would base his decision solely on the evidence, that he would 
follow the law as instructed by the trial court, and that there was no reason that 
he "could not be an impartial and fair juror." R461:Questionnaire 2. 
Defendant faults Juror Mangelson for not revealing on his questionnaire 
"his years of experience as a highway patrolman," "his assignments relating to 
drug interdiction on 1-15," and that he knew Trooper Sheets. Br.Aplt. 20. The 
questionnaire, however, did not ask for such specific information. 
R461:Questionnaire 2. But Juror Mangelson did reveal this information during 
in-chambers questioning. R415. Both sides passed Juror Mangelson for cause. 
R430. 
The record shows that trial counsel 1nade a strategic decision to keep 
Juror Mangelson. Counsel not only knew Juror Mangelson personally, counsel 
had also worked with him when counsel was a prosecuting attorney for Juab 
County and Juror Mangelson was a highway patrol supervisor. R430. Counsel 
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knew that Juror Mangelson "had done a lot of work on freeway stops." R429. 
Counsel believed that Juror Mangelson would be critical of the Trooper's tactics 
in this case and therefore be favorably disposed to the Defendant. R429. In his 
words, counsel "thought" that Juror Mangelson "would hear the evidence of 
how this stop occurred and know that it was not proper." R429. 
Defendant argues that counsel's strategic reasons "were implausible" 
because the propriety of the stop was not for the jury to decide. Br.Aplt. 32. 
Granted, the jury was not directly tasked with deciding the constitutionality of 
the stop. But counsel could nevertheless reasonably strategize that a juror who 
might reasonably conclude that the stop was problematic, might also be 
sympathetic to the defense theory. That theory was to concede guilt on the 
misdemeanor charges involving marijuana, but to contest the felony charges 
involving other drugs and possession of a dangerous weapon. 
Counsel's trial and jury-selection strategies were reasonable. "It is not 
necessarily per se ineffective assistance for a defense attorney to advance a 
nonlegal defense, such as a plea for jury nullification ... when the circumstances 
of the case render other defensive sh·ategies unavailable." People v. Woods, 961 
N.E.2d 466, 473 (Ill. App. 2011). Counsel "may present a defense evoking the 
empathy, compassion or understanding and sympathy of the jurors." Id.; 
Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1089 (9th Cir.2000) (reliance on nullification 
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defense can be "'strategic choice' that survives under Strickland") cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1036 (2001), disapproved of on other grounds, Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 
1036, 1043 (9th Cir.2002)). 
Here, trial counsel suggested that Trooper Sheets stopped Defendant only 
because he was Hispanic and coming from California. R440:98. During cross-
examination, counsel suggested that Sheets may not have been able to clearly 
see Defendant's license plate until after stopping him. R440:96-98. Counsel also 
got Sheets to concede that he may have followed Defendant with his lights 
activated before he could see Defendant's license plate. R440:93-96. 
Then, in closing argument, defense counsel conceded that Defendant was 
driving with marijuana metabolite in his system and that he possessed 
paraphernalia for smoking marijuana. R440:184-86. Counsel argued that 
Defendant's California medical marijuana authorization explained, but did not 
legally justify, his actions in Utah. R440:184-86. But counsel also argued that 
the jury should acquit on the other charges because Defendant did not know of 
the other drugs and paraphernalia in the car, and the knives were tools, not 
dangerous weapons. R440:190-96. 
Counsel's strategy was partially successful. As explained, the jury did 
not convict Defendant of all charges. R263-58. Rather, it acquitted him on the 
dangerous weapon possession count even though he admitted that the knives 
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in the car were his and even though the jury's guilty verdicts on the controlled 
substance possession charges necessarily made Defendant a restricted person. 
One possible explanation for the acquittal on this charge is that Juror 
Mangelson convinced the other jurors to be merciful because the legality of the 
traffic stop was at least debatable. The jury had watched portions of Sheets' 
dash-cam video of the stop and, as mentioned, defense counsel cross-examined 
Sheets' about the details of the stop and the field sobriety tests. R440:46-49,55-
65,93-101. Because counsel may reasonably present a defense based on 
compassion or sympathy, see Woods, 961 N.E.2d at 473, Defendant has not 
shown that his counsel's strategic reason for keeping Juror Mangelson on the 
jury was "implausible and unjustifiable." 
In short, Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his 
counsel made reasonable strategic decisions during jury selection. Nor has he 
shown that any juror was actually biased. Consequently, he has not proven 
that his counsel was ineffective during jury selection. 
D. Defendant could not show that the trial court erred, let alone 
plainly erred, during jury selection. 
Although Defendant argues only that his counsel was ineffective during 
jury selection, he prefaces that argument by implying that the trial court erred 
when it did not require his presence during the in-chambers questioning. 
Defendant asserts that he was" denied the opportunity to be present at a critical 
-44-
• 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
• 
.. 
.. 
" 
" 
stage" of his trial when he was "denied the right to participate" in individual 
juror questioning. Br.Aplt. 16-17. But had Defendant raised this unpreserved 
claim as an allegation of plain error, he still could not have prevailed. 
To show plain error, a defendant must show that a trial court committed 
obvious, prejudicial error. See State v. Beckering, 2015 UT App 53, ,19, 346 P.3d 
672. Defendant could not do so here because controlling law did not require the 
trial court to include Defendant in the in-chambers questioning, or to obtain a 
formal waiver of his presence. 
The "absolute right to be present at all voir dire conferences," including 
in-chambers individual questioning, "has not been expressly recognized in 
Utah." State v. Zamora, 2005 UT App 196U, i-!4. This Court has therefore held 
that a trial court does not plainly err when it questions jurors in chambers 
without the defendant present. State v. Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ,19, 196 P.3d 
124. 
Defendant implies that he had a due process right to be present because 
jury selection is a critical stage of a trial. Br.Aplt. 15. For support, he relies on 
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989), and Hopt v. Utah Territory, 110 
U.S. 574, 578 (1884). Br.Aplt. 15. 
Neither case helps Defendant. Gomez was not about a Defendant's right 
to be present during jury selection. See 490 U.S. 859-62. Rather, it addressed 
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only whether the Federal Magistrates Act allowed a magistrate to preside "at 
the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent." Id. at 
859-60. 
And while Hopt discussed a defendant's presence during jury selection, 
the United States Supreme Court has long since recognized that Hopt "has been 
distinguished and limited." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2 n.1 (1964). In 
fact, the Snyder court stated that what "was said in Hopt v. Utah, ... on the 
subject of the presence of a defendant was dictum, and no more." Id. at 118 n.2. 
Defendant mentions Snyder once, but only in a one-sentence footnote that does 
not account for its express limitation of Hopt. Br.Aplt. 15 n.7. 
As this Court has recognized, Snyder "set out the standard for when a 
defendant has a right to presence under the due process clause." State v. Burk, 
839 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 1992). Under Snyder, a defendant has a due 
process right "to be present ... whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably 
substantiat to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." 
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06. But this right does not require that a defendant be 
present at all proceedings. See id.; see also Burk, 839 P.2d at 886-88 (holding that 
Burk had no right to be present during post-verdict questioning of jurors about 
alleged improper contact with witnesses). Instead, a defendant's constitutional 
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right to be present exists "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be 
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." Id. at 107-08. Thus, a 
defendant need not be present during all communications between a judge and 
a juror. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam) 
(holding that defendant's absence during in-chambers discussion between 
judge and a juror to ascertain bias did not violate defendant's due process 
rights); Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ,I19 (no plain error in interviewing jurors in 
chambers without defendant); Burk, 839 P.2d at 888. When the defendant's 
"presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow," due process does not 
require his presence at a trial proceeding. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07. 
No record evidence shows that Defendant's presence during the 
individual juror questioning would have been useful or beneficial. As noted, 
Defendant cites no record evidence establishing: (1) that he even wished to be 
present during the in-chambers questioning; (2) what his presence would have 
contributed; or (3) that he would not have relied entirely on his counsel's jury 
selection decisions. Thus, Defendant could not establish any right to be present 
during the in-chambers questioning. 
Additionally, as explained, even if Defendant had a clearly-established 
right to be present during in-chambers questioning, he waived that right by not 
asserting it. See State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,J31, 48 P.3d 953. Thus, any error 
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in not including Defendant the in-chambers questioning would not have been 
obvious. See id.; Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ,I 19. Defendant therefore could not 
have shown that the trial court plainly erred. See Beckering, 2015 UT A pp 53, 
,119. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE IN HANDLING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in 
handling the motion to suppress the drugs, paraphernalia, and knives found in 
his car. Br.Aplt. 47. Defendant argues that his trial counsel "failed to make 
timely and proper arguments for suppression of the evidence." Br.Aplt. 48-49. 
Defendant does not argue that his trial counsel should have challenged the 
legality of the initial stop, nor does he argue that the field sobriety tests did not 
establish probable cause to arrest him. Br.Aplt. 39. Rather, he argues only that 
his counsel was ineffective for not persuading the trial court that Trooper Sheets 
"extended the detention beyond the initial purpose of the traffic stop without 
sufficient justification." Br.A plt. 38; see also Br.Aplt. 39 ( declaring that this "case 
involves the officer's actions under the second prong of the analysis" in State v. 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,Il7, 229 P.3d 650). 
Defendant contends that trial counsel should have argued that Trooper 
Sheets lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop because: (1) the dash-cam 
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video contradicted Sheets' observations of Defendant's speech and mannerisms; 
and (2) Defendant's history of controlled substance possession was too old. 
Br.Aplt. 40-42, 44, 49. Defendant also argues that Sheets' trial testimony 
undermined his prior testimony at the suppression hearing. Br.Aplt. 42, 45-46, 
49. 
Defendant's new arguments do not prove that his counsel was ineffective 
in handling the motion to suppress. Defendant improperly parses the evidence, 
rather than examining it as a whole. The video does not refute Sheets' 
observations, and Defendant's criminal history validly contributed to Sheets' 
reasonable suspicion. Moreover, trial counsel could not have relied on Sheets' 
trial testimony in litigating the pre-trial suppression motion. Regardless, 
Sheets' trial testimony did not undermine a reasonable suspicion finding. The 
totality of the circumstances here adequately established reasonable suspicion 
to investigate whether Defendant was under the influence of a controlled 
substance. 
As explained, to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must 
prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Because his ineffectiveness claim hinges on his 
counsel's handling of a motion to suppress evidence, Defendant "must also 
prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a 
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reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the 
excludable evidence." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 
A. Defendant has not shown that his counsel performed deficiently 
in handling the motion to suppress, because the totality of the 
circumstances established reasonable suspicion. 
As explained, to prove deficient performance under Strickland, Defendant 
must show that his counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 688. Put differently, "trial counsel's error must be 
so egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted 
similarly." Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 
2011). 
Because Strickland is grounded in reasonableness, it asks only "whether 
an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under 'prevailing 
professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best practices or most 
common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The Sixth Amendment creates "no expectation that 
competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician." See id. at 110. 
Defendants "have a right to a competent lawyer, but not to Clarence Darrow." 
United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2003). Defendant has not shown 
that any of the arguments that he now raises were so obviously meritorious that 
every reasonable attorney would have recognized and raised them. 
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Like any other seizure, a traffic stop is reasonable if it was (1) "lawful at 
its inception," and (2) "executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). As explained, Defendant challenges only Trooper 
Sheets' decision to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests, not his 
decision to make the initial stop. Br.Aplt. 39. 
A traffic stop is reasonable in its execution so long as the officer 
"diligently pursue[s]" a course of action likely to fulfill the purpose of the stop. 
See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Officers are also allowed '"to 
graduate their responses to the demands of [the] particular situation." Id. 
(citation omitted). Accordingly, if "during the scope of [a lawful] traffic stop, 
the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the 
officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker, 2010 
UT 18, if 13,229 P.3d 650. That occurred here. 
While reasonable suspicion requires more than a "hunch," it does "not 
require an officer to rule out innocent conduct or establish the likelihood of 
criminal conduct to the same degree as required for probable cause." State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ,-r23, 164 P.3d 397. Simply put, reasonable suspicion 
exists "when a law enforcement officer has 'a particularized and objective basis 
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."' Navarette ·v. 
California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (citations omitted). 
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Evaluating whether reasonable susp1c10n exists requires a court to 
examine "the totality of the circumstances." See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266, 274 (2002). Reviewing "courts cannot evaluate individual facts in isolation 
to determine whether each fact has an innocent explanation. Rather, courts 
must look to the 'totality of the circumstances' to determine whether, taken 
together, the facts warranted further investigation by the police officer." State v. 
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ifl4, 147 P.3d 425 (citation omitted). A '"divide-and-
conquer analysis"' is improper. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. The constellation of 
circumstances here show that this traffic stop quickly, and properly, evolved 
into a drug-impaired driving investigation supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Trooper Sheets was a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) with years of 
experience in detecting drug-impaired driving. R436:2,13. He encountered a 
Defendant who could not produce a valid driver's license, had "rapid speech 
and rapid jittery movements" that-in Sheets' experience-were inconsistent 
with typical nervousness, and also had a history of controlled substance abuse. 
R436:8-9;R440:56. 
The constellation of these circumstances established "a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting" Defendant of controlled substance use. See 
Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1687. For example, in State v. Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, ,rs, 
157 P.3d 826, the defendant's "dilated pupils, nervous demeanor, and jerky 
-52-
• 
• 
• 
• 
body movements" established reasonable suspicion to extend a stop to 
investigate possible impairment. Likewise, in State v. Stewart, 2014 UT App 289, 
,I16, 340 P.3d 802, the officer's observations that Stewart was "jittery,"" dancing 
around in the car," and had "constricted" pupils and slurred speech created 
reasonable suspicion justifying further investigation. 
Granted, Trooper Sheets did not see dilated pupils or hear slurred speech. 
But he did hear Defendant's "jittery ... fast speech." R436:8. 
And he also knew that Defendant had a history of drug abuse. 
R436:8;R440:48-49;R460:3-4. As this Court has recognized, relevant criminal 
history "can be a factor in determining reasonable suspicion." State v. 
Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997). Defendant's history of 
controlled substance abuse is an additional factor not present in either Hogue or 
Ste1uart. 
In addition to Defendant's suspicious speech and manner, and his history 
of drug abuse, Defendant also could not produce a valid driver's license. 
R436:6-8. That fact provided another valid consideration in the reasonable 
suspicion calculus. See United States v. Raynor, 108 Fed. Appx. 609, 610, 613 
(10th Cir. 2004) (driver's inability to produce valid driver's license was one 
factor contributing to reasonable suspicion to extend stop). When properly 
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considered together, these facts established reasonable suspicion. See Navarette, 
134 S.Ct. at 1687. 
1. Defendant's speech and manner were valid considerations. 
Defendant argues generally that a suspect's "mannerisms ... when 
considered alone or even with other factors, fail to support reasonable 
suspicion." Br.Aplt. 41. Defendant also contends that Sheets' observations of 
his rapid manner and speech cannot support a reasonable suspicion finding for 
two reasons. Br.Aplt. 42. First, Defendant argues that Sheets undermined any 
reliance on Defendant's speech and mannerisms when Sheets testified at trial 
that "he was not familiar with" Defendant and acknowledged that Defendant's 
manner may "have been his 'normal way."' Br.Aplt. 42 (quoting R440:56-
57,101). Second, Defendant argues that Sheets' dash-cam video "fails to support 
that [Defendant's] speech or manners were rapid or unusual." Br.Aplt. 42. 
Defendant argues that the video "shows that [he] behaved normally." Br.Aplt. 
49. 
None of Defendant's arguments undermines a reasonable susp1c10n 
finding. First, as this Court has held, a suspect' s mannerisms and speech can 
conh·ibute to an officer's reasonable suspicion. See Stewart, 2014 UT App 289, 
-i[16; Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, -i[8. 
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Nor does Sheets' trial testimony acknowledging that Defendant's 
suspicious mannerisms may have been his "normal way" defeat a reasonable 
suspicion finding. Most importantly, trial counsel could not have relied on 
Sheets' trial testimony in opposing a pre-trial motion to suppress. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 12(c)(l)(B) (requiring suppression motion to be filed at least five days 
before trial). 
But even if counsel could have raised this argument in a new trial motion, 
Sheets' acknowledgement of a possible innocent explanation for Defendant's 
suspicious behavior-made outside the context of a suppression hearing-does 
not undermine a reasonable suspicion finding. Although an "officer's suspicion 
must be based on specific and articulable facts and rational inferences," an 
officer's determination of reasonable suspicion "need not rule out the 
possibility of innocent conduct." See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ino, 112 
P.3d 507 (quotations and citations omitted); Cf State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, 
1122-24, 779 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (possible innocent explanations of behavior did 
not undermine sufficiency of evidence showing constructive possession). Thus, 
the fact that Defendant's rapid manner may have had an innocent explanation 
is irrelevant. 
Moreover, Sheets emphasized at the suppression hearing that in his 
highly specialized training and experience, Defendant's behavior was atypical 
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and suggested drug use. R436:2,8-9,13. Sheets' observations thus provided 
ample reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Defendant to conduct field sobriety 
tests. See, e.g., Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, ,IS (dilated pupils, nervous demeanor, 
and jerky body movements justified brief detention to conduct field sobriety 
tests); State v. Richards, 2009 UT App 397, ,IlO, 224 P.3d 733 (emphasizing 
officer's training and experience in evaluating reasonable suspicion). 
Nor has Defendant shown that the dash-cam video refutes Sheets' 
observations. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately evaluate Defendant's 
manner and speech in the less-than-two-minute portion of the video showing 
Sheets' interaction with Defendant before Sheets orders him out of the car for 
field sobriety tests. SE #1 at 11:23:50-11:25:20. Defendant's movements are 
mostly indiscernible; only the back of Defendant's head is visible. Id. Most of 
what Defendant says is largely unintelligible. Id. And at least a portion of what 
is intelligible arguably supports Sheets' characterization of Defendant's speech 
as "fast." Id.;R436:8. As Sheets explained at trial, the video supports his trained 
observation that Defendant exhibited rapid speech and mannerisms. R440:99 
("Well, like you saw in the video, it appears that he had fast speech, and he has 
fast movements."). 
Defendant's behavior after he is out of the car does not undermine a 
reasonable suspicion finding for three reasons. First, Defendant's out-of-the-car 
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behavior is largely irrelevant because, by then, Sheets had already decided to 
· extend the stop. Second, Defendant's behavior once he knows he is under close 
scrutiny for field sobriety testing is not necessarily indicative of his behavior 
during what he would had perceived to be a more spontaneous interaction with 
Sheets during the initial portion of the stop. 
Finally, while it may appear to appellate counsel's untrained eye that 
Defendant's behavior is unremarkable, appellate counsel is not a DRE. Sheets 
was. R440:13. Sheets' specialized training and extensive experience is critical 
here because officers "may draw on their own experiences and specialized 
training to make inferences from deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that might well elude an untrained person."' State ·v. 
Anderson, 2013 UT App 272, ,-i27, 316 P.3d 949 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, rather than dispelling Sheets' suspicion that Defendant was 
impaired, the field sobriety tests confirmed that suspicion, something 
Defendant does not dispute. R436:12-15. Sheets' also observed that Defendant 
had eyelid h·emors during the tests, a fact that is impossible to see on the video. 
R440:61;SE#l 11:36:15-11:43:39. 
Defendant suggests that Sheets "changed" his testimony about the nature 
of Defendant's speech by describing it at the suppression hearing as "fast" and 
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"jittery," and then describing it at trial as "rapid." Br.Aplt. 40-41. But 
Defendant does not explain how these two synonymous descriptions are 
inconsistent. 
In sum, Defendant's rapid speech and mannerisms were valid 
considerations and Defendant has not shown that the video refutes Sheets' 
trained observations. And even if the video arguably refuted some of Sheets' 
observations, it does not so clearly do so that all reasonable counsel would have 
raised that argument in a suppression motion. Defendant therefore has not 
shown that his counsel performed deficiently by not challenging the validity of 
Sheets' observations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
2. Defendant's history of drug possession was a valid 
consideration. 
Defendant also argues that his history of convictions and arrests for drug 
possession cannot support a reasonable suspicion finding because his last arrest 
was three years before the stop. Br.Aplt. 44. But Defendant cites no authority 
holding that criminal history can become too stale to be considered in the 
reasonable suspicion context. Two of the cases he cites involve the more 
rigorous probable cause standard, not the reasonable suspicion standard at 
issue here. See State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993) (reviewing 
whether probable cause supported search warrant); State v. Keener, 2008 UT 
App 288, ,IS, 191 P.3d 835 (same). 
-58-
.. 
.. 
.. 
" 
Defendant also argues that under State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 
(Utah App. 1997), this Court held that criminal history must be "ongoing" to be 
relevant in the reasonable suspicion context. Br.Aplt. 43. But Hymphrey did not 
limit relevant criminal history to only that which is "ongoing." See 937 P.2d at 
143. Rather, the Humphrey court observed that "information regarding an 
individual's past, and in this case ongoing, criminal activity can be a factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion." Id. The observation that Humphrey's 
criminal activity happened to be "ongoing" thus served only to bolster the 
reasonable suspicion finding in that case, not to limit reasonable suspicion 
analysis in every case to consideration of only "ongoing" criminal activity. See 
id. 
Defendant also argues that an officer must have personal knowledge of a 
suspect' s criminal history for it to contribute to reasonable suspicion. Br.Aplt. 
43. The State does not dispute that an officer must base his suspicion on factors 
he personally knows. But here, Trooper Sheets did know about Defendant's 
criminal history because dispatch informed him of it before he decided to 
extend the stop and conduct field sobriety tests. R460:4. 
Defendant's criminal history was relevant. A defendant's "criminal 
history contributes powerfully to the reasonable suspicion calculus" when considered 
with other factors. United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2010) 
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(quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Humphrey, 937 
P.2d at 143. 
Defendant's history of drug-related arrests and convictions contributed to 
Sheets' reasonable suspicion. Defendant had a 2001 charge and a later 2001 
felony conviction for controlled substance possession; a 2006 felony charge for 
controlled substance possession; and, in 2007, had violated his probation by 
again possessing controlled substances. R460:3-4. Although Defendant's 
probation violation was three years before this stop, five years separated 
Defendant's initial controlled substance conviction and his 2006 felony 
possession charge. R460:3-5. His history therefore demonstrated recurring and 
lengthy involvement with controlled substances. Defendant has thus not 
shown that his trial counsel was deficient for not challenging Sheets' reliance on 
his criminal history. 
3. Other factors do not undermine a reasonable suspicion 
finding. 
Defendant argues that other factors undermined the reasonable suspicion 
finding. First, he asserts that he was polite and cooperative and answered 
Sheets' questions clearly and honestly. Br.Aplt. 45. But Defendant cites no 
authority holdi...'l.g that these factors negate a highly-trained officer's 
observations of speech and mannerisms that suggest controlled substance use, 
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especially when coupled with a suspect's long history of drug abuse and 
inability to produce a valid driver's license. 
Second, Defendant argues that "Sheets changed his story at trial" about 
how he first encountered Defendant's car. Br.Aplt. 45-46, 49. At the 
suppression hearing, Sheets testified that he was stopped on the side of 
northbound 1-15 when Defendant passed him and he noticed the missing 
sticker on Defendant's license plate. R436:31-32. At trial, Sheets testified that he 
was traveling southbound when he noticed Defendant's car headed 
northbound and decided to follow it because it initially looked like a Honda, 
and Hondas are often stolen. R440:93-94. Sheets testified at trial that he drove 
across the median, caught up to Defendant's car, and then noticed the missing 
license plate sticker. R440:95-96. 
Sheets also acknowledged for the first time at trial that his overhead 
lights may have been on when he drove through the median and began 
following Defendant. R440:93-95. Sheets suggested that his dash cam video 
confirmed this, although he later testified that he may have, at some point, 
turned his lights off and then on again. R440:93-95. The video, however, shows 
that Sheets' lights were off for at least 30 seconds as he approached Defendant. 
SE#l at 11:22:42-11:23:30. It also shows that, before activating his lights, Sheets 
pulled alongside Defendant close enough to allow him to examine Defendant's 
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license plate, and only then pulled directly behind Defendant before activating 
his lights. SE#l at 11:22:42-11:23:30. 
Sheets' inconsistency about how he first noticed Defendant's car is 
irrelevant for three reasons. First, as explained, trial counsel could not have 
relied on Sheets' trial testimony to support his pre-trial suppression motion. 
Second, this inconsistency goes only to Sheets' justification for the initial stop. 
As explained, Defendant does not contend that his counsel should have 
challenged the initial stop. Br.Aplt.38-39. Third, the video confirms that Sheets 
did not activate his lights until after he had the opportunity to view 
Defendant's noncompliant license plate. SE#l at 11:22:42-11:23:30. The stop 
was therefore justified at its inception. See State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, 116, 259 
P.3d 116 (stop is justified if officer reasonably believes traffic violation has 
occurred). 
In sum, Defendant has not shown that his counsel performed deficiently 
for not raising these additional arguments in the motion to suppress. 
B. Defendant has not shown prejudice because none of the 
additional arguments he now raises would have persuaded the 
trial court to grant a motion to suppress. 
For these same reasons, Defendant cannot prove prejudice. As explained, 
none of the additional arguments Defendant now raises would have persuaded 
the trial court to grant a motion to suppress. Defendant has not shown that 
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Sheets lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to briefly detain him to 
conduct field sobriety tests. Defendant thus cannot demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance, if any. Defendant 
therefore fails to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective. See Kimmelman, 477 
U.S. at 375. 
III. 
The trial court did not plainly err in appointing conflict counsel 
to address a possible ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 
Defendant argues that although the trial court identified potential claims 
of trial counsel ineffectiveness, it "failed to appoint counsel to represent 
[Defendant] in the post-trial proceedings." Br.Aplt. 52. Rather, Defendant 
argues that the trial court "simply appointed an attorney as amicus to address 
one distinct issue for the court." Br.Aplt. 52. Defendant argues that this was 
plain error because he had a right to conflict counsel who would represent him 
"in a meaningful way." Br.Aplt. 52. Defendant misinterprets the record. 
The State does not dispute that Defendant had a right to independent 
counsel to address any post-trial claim that his h·ial counsel was ineffective. 
The State disputes, however, Defendant's assertion that the trial court did not 
appoint him independent counsel. 
After trial, the trial court sua sponte raised two issues of possible trial 
counsel ineffectiveness. R268-67. The court was concerned that trial counsel 
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did not (1) "file any memorandum following an evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress"; or (2) remove Juror Mangelson. R268. The 
court later withdrew its concern about Juror Mangelson. R285 
n.1;R441 :2;R442:4,7-8. 
The court appointed conflict counsel, Mr. Tate Bennett, to represent 
Defendant for purposes of the court's sua sponte notice. R274;R441:6. Bennett 
filed what he .titled an" Amicus Brief" explaining that trial counsel's failure to 
file a memorandum supporting the motion was not prejudicial because, once 
counsel moved to suppress, the prosecution bore the burden to prove that the 
search was lawful. R286-79. Bennett further noted that the trial court denied 
the suppression motion on the merits, not merely because trial counsel failed to 
file a supporting memorandum. R282. 
After receiving Mr. Bennett's memo, the trial court withdrew its sua 
sponte notice regarding ineffective assistance of counsel issues. R442:8-9. The 
court explained that although it was initially concerned with trial counsel's 
"failure to file a memorandum" supporting the suppression motion, the court 
was satisfied that the lack of a memorandum did not amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel for the reasons Bennett had explained. R442:8. The court 
noted, however, that it was not ruling on whether it erred in denying the 
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suppression motion and that trial counsel could address that potential issue in a 
new trial motion. R448:9,12. 
Thus, the trial court did appoint Bennett as II conflict counsel" to 
independently represent Defendant. R274;R441:6. Bennett, however, 
apparently viewed his role as only II a friend of the Court." R286. But that is 
Bennett's fault, not the trial court's. If Bennett failed to effectively address 
potential ineffective assistance of trial counsel issues, then Defendant's 
argument should be that Bennett was ineffective, not that the trial court plainly 
erred in appointing him. 
But, as explained above, Defendant has not proven that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in any respect. Therefore, even if Defendant had claimed that 
Bennett was ineffective in his post-trial representation, Defendant still could not 
have prevailed. 
Nor could Defendant prevail even if this were properly viewed as a plain 
error claim. Plain error requires proof of obvious, prejudicial error. State v. 
Beckering, 2015 UT App 53, ,I19, 346 P.3d 672. Defendant has not shown 
prejudicial error, because he has not shown that conflict counsel could have 
proven that his trial counsel was ineffective. 
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IV. 
This court should remand for the limited purpose of correcting a 
clerical error in Defendant's sentence. 
This Court should remand for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical 
error in Defendant's sentence. The trial court entered Defendant's conviction 
on Count II (hydrocodone possession) as a third degree felony. R295;R442:13-
14. But at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution amended Count II to a class 
B misdemeanor. R2,27;R435:10. The trial court noted the amendment on the 
original Information, but not on the Amended Information. R2,12. 
The trial court imposed a 0-5 year prison sentence on Count II, but 
suspended that sentence and placed Defendant on probation for 24 months. 
R295-93;R442:13-14. It imposed sentence on 14 February 2013, but suspended 
the sentence for six weeks to allow the filing of a new trial motion. R293. In 
September 2014, the trial court terminated Defendant's probation 
unsuccessfully because, although he had satisfied all other probation 
conditions, Defendant had not fully paid his fines and fees. R459. 
Defendant's conviction on Count II should have been entered only as a 
Class B misdemeanor. This Court should remand for the limited purpose of 
allowing the h·ial court to correct that clerical error. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) 
(allowing for the correction of a clerical error in a judgment "at any time"). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm, but nevertheless 
remand for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical error in Defendant's 
sentence. 
Respectfully submitted on May 13, 2015. 
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NEPHI, UTAH - NOVEMBSR 1, 2012 
JUDGE JAMES BRADY 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be acc~rate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
BAI~IFF: The Honorable James Brady presiding. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. 
We're here today on a case of the State of Utah vs. 
Abisai Martinez-Castellanos. This is case number 101600146. 
I'll note that the defendant is cresent with counsel. 
St2te is present with counsel as well. 
Mr. Eldridge, is the state ready to proceed? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Yes, ~our Honor. 
The 
THE COURT: Mr. Harmon is the defendant ready to 
proceed? 
M~. !!AR:"'.ION: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tha nk you. 
I'm going to ask the clerk now ~o go through a role 
call of those of you wh o are present just as perspective 
=u r cr s . First, let me say that I appreciate you being here 
and welcome to our cour t room. We're going to spend a l i ttle 
time this morning go over a jury process, and I 'll exolain 
that as we go, but righ~ now we need to have a r~ i e call. Sn 
as my clerk calls y ou r name, ~f you would, please, raise your 
hand so ~hat I can vis~ally see who is responding and also 
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because this is being recorded. Would you simply indicate 
your present by saying here or presen~ or something to that 
affect? 
Go ahead, Cindy. 
COURT CLERK: Jeffrey Bradley? 
MR. BRADLEY: Present. 
COURT CLERK: Paul Mangelson? 
MR. MANGELSON: Present. 
COURT CLERK: Karen Sachra? 
MS. SACHRA: Here. 
COURT CLERK: Phil Sperry? 
MR. SPERRY: Here. 
COURT CLERK: David [inaudible] ? 
MR. ?: [inaudible] 
COURT CLERK: Curt Stevens? 
MR. STEVENS: Here. 
COU~T CLERK: Shelly Richardson? 
MS. RICHARDSON: Here. 
COURT CLERK: Leon Greenausch? 
MR. LEON GREENAUSCH: Here. 
COURT CLERK: Robert Kauffman? 
MR. KAUFFMAN: Here. 
COURT CLERK: Brittany L=, 1_ rd, 
MS. :SAIRD: [inaudible] . 
COURT CLERK: Rodney Steel? 
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1 MR. STEEL: [inaudible] 
• 2 COURT CLERK: Lucy Jones? 
3 MS. JONES: Here. 
4 COURT CLERK: Gary Wood? 
• 5 MR. WOOD: Here. 
6 COURT CLERK: Deborah Barnes? 
7 MS . BARNES: Here. 
• 8 COURT CLERK: Chet Farr? 
9 MR. FARR: Here. 
• 
10 COURT CLERK: Mitchell Durban? 
11 MR. DURBAN: Here. 
12 COURT CLERK: Mark [inaudible] ? 
,. 13 MR. ? : Yes. 
14 COURT CLERK: Anna Gage? 
15 MS. GAGE: Here. 
• 16 
COURT CLERK: Kelly Lynn? 
17 MS. , LYNN: Here. 
18 COURT CLERK: Mark Worthington? 
19 MR. WORTHINGTON: Present. 
20 COURT CLERK: Rod Greenausch? 
21 MR. ROD GREENAUSH: Present. 
22 COURT CLERK: Lisa Blackett? 
23 MS. BLACKETT: Present. 
24 COURT CLERK: Jerry Kindle? 
• 25 MR. KINDLE: Here. 
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COURT CLERK: Russell Morgan? 
MR. MORGAN: Here. 
COURT CLERK: Kimberly Kay? 
MS. KAY: Here. 
COURT CLERK: Lisa Jacobson? 
MS. JACOBSON: Here. 
THE COURT: Thank you all very much. As I indicated 
before, I appreciate your being here today. We welcome you 
here. I know that for some of you, you've set aside matters 
that are important to you, whether that's family, or work, or 
other activities in order to make time to respond to the call 
to serve today in this jury selection process. Besides 
voting, which hopefully everybody gets a chance to do here or 
r.as already done, serving on a jury is perhaps one of the 
most interactive ways you have in being involved in our 
conmunities government. We often talk about the government 
as though it's a third party. Somebody out there is our 
government, and I understand that perspective, but the 
reality is today you are part of that process, and you are 
part of thaL government operation. T~e role as a perspect~ve 
juror or as a juror requires a mind that 's cleansed of all 
prejudices and biases. You may be called uoon to resolve 
dispu~es of facts w~c,rc differenc parties are testifying 
abcct the same event differently. Yo~r role, if you're 
selected to serve on the jury, will be to function as the 
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judge of those facts and determine what facts actually 
happened. The true measure of your service as a juror is 
your intention in this case, your mature consideration of the 
facts, and the quality of your verdict. Today, we're going 
to select eight jurors to hear this case. The reason we have 
so many of you here is because our experience over the years 
indicates that we need to start with a group of about this 
size in order to be able to select eight people to serve 
finally as jurors. From this group, the attorneys and I will 
select those final eight. 
You've filled out questionnaires, and I wanted to 
express my appreciation. The questionnaires assist us in 
that selection process. I need to make sure that you 
understand that by saving us this time with those 
questionnaires, we also respect your privacy in those 
questionnaires and the information you provide to us in those 
documents are kept private. As I indicated earlier, this 
case should only take one day. After we select the final 
jury panel to go forward, I'll go over the daily schedule 
with you. 
At that point, I'm going to ask all of you various 
questions. So before I ask you those questions, I'm going to 
have my clerk place you under oath to answer those questions 
truthfully. So if you would, I'm going to ask all of our 
prospective jurors to please stand and raise your right hand. 
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My clerk is going to administer an oath to all of you. 
(Whereupon the prospective jurors were sworn) 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. I'm now going to 
go over what the qualifications are to serve as a juror, and 
I'm going to ask if anybody feels they're not qualified. To 
serve as a juror, you must be 18 years of age or older. You 
must be a US ci~izen, a resident of Juab County, and be able 
to read, write, and understand the English language. Is 
there anybody present who feels that they don't meet one or 
more of these qualifications? If so, please raise your hand? 
I'll note that nobody is raising their hand. 
You are disqualified from serving on a jury if you 
have been convicted of a felony or if you're serving in the 
active military service and jury service would interfere with 
your miss i on, or if you're not capable of serving because of 
some physical or mental disability that would interfere with 
your ability to sit and listen, deliberate, and render a 
verdict in this case. If any of you believe that you should 
be disqualified from serving for one of those three reasons, 
please raise your hand? I ' ll note thot nobody has raised 
their hand. 
No qualified prospective juror is exempt for jury 
service~ 
a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public 
necessity. A hardship must be a true hardship, and it cannot 
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be excused for slight or trivial causes. You cannot be 
excused for hardship or inconvenience to your business. Keep 
Is in mind that I anticipate this trial will take one day. 
there anybody here who believes that they should be 
disqualified because of undue hardship, extreme 
inconvenience, or for public necessity? If so, please raise 
your hand. I'll note that nobody has raised their hand. 
At this point, I'm going to acquaint you with the 
case by reading from the information the charges that we will 
be dealing with. I'd like you to listen to these charges. 
I'm going to ask you at a later time if you have heard of 
this case or if you are acquainted with any of the facts of 
this case. So let me make certain that you listen closely. 
The State of Utah vs. Abisai Martinez-Castellanos. Jared W. 
Eldridge, Juab County Attorney, state of Utah, accuses the 
defendant, Abisai Martinez-Castellanos, of the following 
accounts. Count one, possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony. In that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos on or 
about June 9th , 2010 in Juab County, Utah knowingly and 
intentionally possessed methamphetamine, a controlled 
substance. 
Count two, possession of hydrocodone, a third 
degree felony. In that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos on or 
about June 9th, 2010 in Juab County, Utah knowingly and 
intentionally possessed hydrocodone, a controlled substance. 
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Count three, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
category two restricted person, a Class A misdemeanor. In 
that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos having been convicted or 
under indictment for a =elony, or within the last seven years 
having been adjudicated delinquent for an offense, which if 
committed by an adult, would have been a violent felony, or 
is under - or is an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 
or in poss - or is in possession of a controlled substance 
Schedule I or II, or has been found guilty by reason of 
insanity, not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony 
offense, or has been dishonorably discharged from the armed 
forces, or has renounced his citizenship on or about June 
9 th , 2010 in Juab County, Utah did possess, transfer, possess 
- did purchase, transfer, possess, use or had under his 
custody or control any dangerous weapon other than a firearm. 
Count four, driving with any measurable controlled 
substance in the body, a Class G misdemeanor. In that Abisai 
Martinez-Castellanos on or about June 9 th , 2010 in Juab 
County, Utah did operate or was in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle when he had any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in his 
• 
body. I 
A~d ca~nt f ~ve, poss e s s i on o f drug paraphernalia, a 
Class B misdemeanor. In that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos on 
or about June 9th , 2Cl0 in Juab County, Utah did possess with 
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the intent to use drug paraphernalia. Dated this 22 nd day of 
June, 2010. Signed by Jared W. Eldridge, Juab County 
Attorney. 
I'm now going to ask each of you to take just a 
moment and stand and introduce yourselves to us. We'll start 
up here on the lefthand side with Mr. Bradley. Not - let me 
get - tell you what I need, and then I'll have you stand up, 
but we'll start with Mr. Bradley and go across that top row, 
come down here to Ms. Richardson, go across the front row, 
then we'll move over to Ms. Jones, go across your row, and 
then we'll move back to Mr. Lynn, and go down that row. What 
I'd like you to do is to simply stand, tell us your name, the 
community that you live in, and your employment. If you are 
married, give us your spouse's name and the employment that 
your spouse has. If you forget these items, just ask me, and 
I'll be glad to go over them again with you. 
Mr. Bradley, if you would start? 
MR. BRADLEY: My name is Jeffrey Bradley. I live in 
Eureka. I'm a [inaudible]. I'm m·arried to · [inaudible]. I 
work in Springville at [inaudible] Tech. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Next? 
MR. MANGELSON: Paul Mangelson. I live in Levan, 
Utah. I'm retired. My wife's name is Sandra. She's also 
retired. I believe that's it. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Ms. Sachra, is it? 
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~S. SACHRA: Uh-huh (affirmative). I'm Carolyn 
Sachra. I'm a piano teacher. I'm retired. My husband is 
Henry. I live in (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SPERRY: Ph i l Sperry. My wife's name is 
Dorothy. I'm 70 years old. I live in Nephi. I 'D retired 
after 42 years in [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. PREVOS T: My name's Stacy Prevost. I 'm from 
Nephi. I'm not married. I'm widowed, and I [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. STEVENS: My name is Curt Stevens. I work for 
Capital (inaudible) 3ank. I am married, and my wife's name 
is Etta. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. STEVENS: I live in Mona. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. RICHAR0SON: I'm Shelly Richardson. I'm married 
to Sam Richardson, and I'm a stay-at-home mother, and he 
works at [i~audible]. 
~EE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. GREENAUSCH: Leon Greenaush. I l ive in Nephi. 
My •.-rife j_s !<e l ly . She wo:rk:s i :1 Nephi . 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR . KAUFFMAN: Bob Kauffman. I live in Nephi. I 
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work at NRP, and my wife's name is Barb. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. LAIRD: Brittany Laird, and I live in Nephi. 
And I'm a cosmetologist, and that's all. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. STEEL: I'm Rod Steel. I live in Nephi. I work 
at Novel, and I am married to Tricia who is a stay-at-home 
mom. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. JONES: I'm Lucy Jones from Nephi. I'm an 
instructional assistant at Red Cliffs Elementary School here 
in Nephi. I'm married to Nelson Jones, and he's a retired 
dentist . 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. WOOD: Gary Wood. I live in Levan. I work for 
Ashco Cement. I'm married to Stephanie, and she works for 
[inaudible] Town. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. BARNES: I'm Deborah Barnes. I'm from Mona. 
I'm a stay-at-home mom. My husband's Val Barnes, and he 
works for the LDS Church. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. FARR: My name is Chet Farr. I live in Mona, 
Utah. I work for Big D Construction. I'm a superintendent. 
My wife works at the Nephi Hospital as a housekeeper. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. DURBAN: I'm Mitch Durban. I live here in 
Nephi. I'm a journeyman electrician. I'm married, and her 
name' s .A.ng ie. 
Tl-IS COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SPELT: I'm Lawrence Spelt. I'm retired from 
Tooele Army Depot. I work at WalMart now. My wife is 
Shirley. She sells Avon. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. GAGE: I'm Anna Gage. I live in Nephi. I'm a 
widow and retired school teacher. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. LYNN : Kelly Lynn. I live in Nephi . I'm a 
registered nurse. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. WORTHINGTON: My name's Mark Worthington. I 
live in Nephi. I work for the Utah County Jail as a nurse. 
My wife's name is Jody. She works for Nebo View Elementary 
School as a teacher. 
THE C00RT: Thank you . 
MR. ROD GREENAUSCH: Rod Greenausch . I work for 
Eas~ Stake Consultants. I l i ve in Nephi. My wife's a 
reoistered r; c.rse at tl :e hospital. 
THE COURT: Thank ycu. 
MS. BLACKETT: Lisa Blackett. I live in Nephi. I'm 
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married to Morris Blackett. He works at Intermountain Power 
in Delta. I own a dance studio, and I work for Juab High 
School. 
THE COURT: Thank you . 
MR. KENDALL: Jared Kendall. I work for Tarr 
Plumbing. My wife's Scarlet . She works for Juab School 
District . 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MORGAN: Russell Morgan. I live in Nephi. My 
wife's Betty . We're both retired. 
THE COURT: Thank you . 
MS. KAY: Kim Kay. Mona, Utah, and I do mortgage 
lending. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. JACOBSON: I'm Lisa Jacobson. I live in Nephi. 
My husband's Brian. We own Sunset Rental, a fabrication 
company, and I'm a stay-at-home mom, except on Tuesdays I do 
our payroll. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. As jurors in this 
case, you will be the sole triers of the fact. This means 
that you're going to determine what the true facts in this 
matter are. As the judge, I'm referred to as the court. My 
constitutional and statutory duty is to preside over this 
case to see that the law and procedures are followed and to 
instruct you on - as jurors on what the law is that's 
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applicable to tiis case. I do not personally create this 
law. I simply instruct on what the law is as set forth in 
our federal constitution, our state constitution, and the 
acts of our legislators in passing their laws as well as the 
laws that are interpreted by supreme courts and courts of 
appeal. Are you willing to accept all of the statements that 
I tell you as to what the law is, regardless of what you 
personally believe the law is or ought to be? If not, please 
raise your hand. Nobody has raised their hand. 
Under our constitutional system of justice, a 
person is presumed in~ocent unless they are proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the highest standard of 
proof known in the law. The mere fact that somebody has been 
charged with a crime is not evidence that that person has 
cormnitted a crime, and it creates no presumption that the 
person has com~itted a crime. Is there anybody wjo disagrees 
with or has any problems with the principle that I just 
stated? If so, please raise your hand. I'll note that 
nobody has raised their hand. 
If chosen as a juror, yo u must try this case solely 
upon the evidence that's provided by witnesses appearing 
before you and the exhibits or physical evidence that's 
presen~ed in this cour~r~om today. You a re not to rely on 
a n y information that's obtained outside of the testimony and 
the exhibits presented in this case. If there's anybody who 
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believes they cannot try a case solely based on testimony and 
evidence presented in this courtroom today, please raise your 
hand? I' ll note that nobody has raised their hand. 
I'm r.ow going to ask the attorneys in this case to 
stand and introduce themselves. I want them to describe who 
they represent, and also state what witnesses they intend to 
call, and I'll also ta lk about who their associated attorneys 
are ttat work with them. Listen closely, because after they 
introduce themselves, their witnesses, and their assoc iated 
attorneys, I'm going to ask you about how you might know 
these people or might have some relationship to them. 
r:.:::..dridge. 
So let's begin with the State. Mr. Eldridge? 
MR. ~LDRIDGE: Thank you. My name is Jared 
I'~ the Juab County Attorney. I'Jl be 
representing the state in ttis c ase today. As far as 
w~tnesses go, we only intend to call one witness today, and 
that would be Trooper John Sh e ets, who is s~tting here. And 
attorneys that are ass ociated with our office, we have Ann 
Marie iioward, who used to be Ann Mar ie Trompvine for those of 
yo u who have been here a while . She works in our off ice on a 
part ~ime ba sis . We also have Perry □~vis who works in our 
... ~ ' oi:r:._ce. He's married to Molly . It used ~o be Molly Pai~ter 
for ~h os e of you wha kno~ the ~a~nccr fa~i ly, a~d he alsc 
works in our office , al t hoJgh he's been recent l y activated, 
he's serv i ng in Hawai i right now . 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Harmon? 
MR. HARMON: My name is Milton Harmon. I am the 
defense attorney in this case and represent my client, Abis2i 
Martinez-Castellanos, a~d I don't speak Spanish well. So I 
can't pronounce his name exactly, but that's the way I say 
it, and Mr. Castellanos will be testifying in his own behalf. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Now, I need to ask of the prospective jurors if any 
of you are related by blood or as an in-law to any party, 
witness, attorney, or associated attorney in this case? If 
so, please raise your hand. I'll note that nobody has raised 
their hand . 
Do any of you have a professional, business or 
financial relationship to any party , witness, at~orney, or 
attorneys associate? These relationships can include such 
associations as debtor/creditor, employer/employee, partner , 
landlord/tenant, or so on. If any of you have such a 
relatio~ship with any of the parties, witnesses, attorneys, 
or associate attorneys, please raise your hand? I'll not 
that nobody tas raised their hand. 
0o any of you have a soc i al, religious, neig~borly, 
witnesses, attorneys, or assccia~e attorneys that you were 
introduced to? If so, please raise your hand. I see a 
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co~ple of hands coming up. Just s o that I can ma r k all of 
these down, I'm going to go through it kind of orderly. 
You're Mr. Sperry? Is that correct? 
MR. SPERRY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank ycu, Mr. Spe r ry. 
As I ask these questions and as you raise your 
hands, we're just going to make note of that. I'rn not going 
to ask you co describe anything in open court right now. It 
may be that the attorneys will want to ask you more questions 
about that later. We'll go into a place where we can have 
some privacy and discuss it. 
So, Mr. Sperry, you've indicated yes to this 
question. 
Did I see another hand over here? And that would 
be Ms. Richardson? Is that correct? Anybody else on th i s 
side of the room? Okay. Turning over to the ot~er side of 
the room, I saw quite a few hands. Mr. Wood, and is t hat Mr . 
Farr? No . Mr. Durban? Is tha~ correct, Mr. Durban? Thank 
you. Anybo dy else en the front rcw? Okay . Then o n the back 
row, I see Mr. Greenausch, and is t ha t Mr. Kendal? No . Mr. 
Mor gan? Thank you, Mr. Mo rgan. And Ms. Jacobson? Thank you 
very mu::::h. Is there anybody who has a relationship, as I've 
ju3~ described, whose ~aie I have~'t callPd? 0:-<:2y, I h~nk 
you. 
Do any of you have a relationship with any o ther 
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prospective juror in this courtroom where you have a position 
of authority over that prospective juror or they have a 
position of authority over you, such as at work, at church, 
or in organizations, or otherwise? If so, please raise your 
hand. I'll note that nobody has raised their hand. 
Do any of you have a family member or a close 
personal friend who is a law enforcement officer or works for 
a law enforcement department? If so, please raise your hand. 
Okay. Mr. Sperry and Ms. Laird; is that correct? Anybody 
else on this side? Then we'll go over to the other side. 
Ms. Jones, I see your hand. Mr. Wood, your hand. That would 
be Mr. Bell? Thank you, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Lynn, Mr. 
Wor t hington. Anybody else whose hand is raised whose name I 
didn't call? ~hank you. 
Have you, a family member, or a close personal 
friend been a victiili of a crime? If so, please raise your 
hand. Ms. Sachra, ~r. Sperry. Thank you. Anybody else on 
this side? Then going over to the other side I see on the 
fro~t row Mr. Bell. 
Kendal, and Ms. Kay. 
On the back row I see Ms. Blackett, Mr. 
: s that correct? Anybody whose name I 
haven't ca1l e d? Thank you. ~av e you, a fam i ly member, or a 
close persona ~ friend be e n a defendant in a criminal case? 
If so, ~l e ase raise your hand. Mr . Ste e l. Is that Mr. Farr? 
MR. FARR: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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I see Ms. Jacobson stand. Anybody else whose na~e 
I haven't called? Thank you. 
Please raise your r.and if because of hearing about 
this case outside of court, you have any knowledge of the 
facts involved or have formed er expressed an opinion with 
respect to this case or the facts in this case. 
that nobody has raised their hand. 
I'll note 
Have any of you previously served on a jury? If 
so, please raise your hand. I see Ms. Gage. Ms. Gage, may I 
just ask was it a civil or a cri~inal jury? 
MS. GAGE: Criminal. 
THE COURT: And how long ago was that? 
MS. GAGE: About five years ago. 
THE COURT: And where was that? 
MS. GAGE: Bakersfield, California. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Anybody else? I see another hand back here, and 
that's Ms. Blackett's? 
MS. BLACKETT: Uh-huh (a ~fi rma t ive). 
THE COURT: And, Ms. B~ackett, how long ago was 
that? 
MS. BLACKETT: =twa s probably about 1 5 years ago. 
MS. BLACKETT: ~twas criminal and here. 
THE COURT: Yo~ said that was here in Nephi? 
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MS. BLACKETT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Anybody else? Thank 
you. 
Have you, a family member, or a close friend been 
involved with the same alleged conduct which is charged in 
this case? If so, please raise your hand. That would be Ms. 
Provos-c. ~s that correct? A~ybody else? I see Ms. - excuse 
me. I 'm sorry. Ms. Blackett's hand. 
MS. BLACKETT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank yo~. 
The question is whether you, a family member, or a 
close friend has been involve with the same kind of conduct 
that is being discussed in this case? Okay. So Ms. Sachra 
also. Anybody else? I see Ms. Kay and Ms. Jacobson's hands. 
Thank you. Anybody else whose name I haven't called? Okay. 
~he statement of counsel -- the s~atements of 
counsel and their questions are not evidence, and they're not 
to be considered as evidence. The evidence you will consider 
is only the testimony and exhibits presented to you by the 
witnesses inside the courtroo~ . Please raise your hand lf 
there's any reason best known to you why you could not try 
this case fairly and impartially based solely on the evidence 
iv i t h u u L. a r1 y ;) i a s o r p re j u di c e: :C v r or a g c. i n s t 
I ' l l note that no hands have been raised. 
If you were a party in this case, either the s~ate 
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or the defendant, wo~ld you be fully satisfied to have you~ 
case tried by a person of your present attitude and frame of 
mind towards this case? If not, please raise your hand. 
I'll note that no hands were raised. 
Counsel, tjat concludes the voir dire that I'm 
going to conduct in co~rt. For members o= the prospective 
jury, I'm going to take a break now and meet with counsel in 
my chambers, and they will determine any additional questions 
They may ask questions of each of that they'd like to ask. 
you or only some of yoc. You're free to walk about, stretch 
your legs. Stay in the courtroom, because we may be calling 
you. I'm going to ask you to not discuss this case or the 
fact that we're here on ttis case with each other while we're 
taking this break. You can talk about the weather. You can 
talk about snorts. You can talk about anything else, but 
let's not discuss this case at this time. I will be in a 
brief recess until we come back in, which may be in a few 
minutes. 
Counsel, if you'll just join me back in my 
chambers, I'd a9preciate it. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS) 
THE COURT: You ca n certainly call him in and ask 
hin . Whc de ;o~ wan~ t o start wi~h? 
COURT CLERK: ~r. Bradley? 
THE COURT: Counsel may have a few questions for 
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you. 
TIME 9:38:52 TO 10:31:59 (Microphone left open in courtroom 
overlapping chamber audio, rendering proceedings in chambers 
to be unintelligible. 
PROCEEDINGS IN OPEN COURT 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. We 
appreciate your patience. The processes we go through may be 
a little bit deliberate and slow, but they're done for a 
reason. This is the time now for what we refer to as the 
peremptory challenges. Counsel is going to review the list 
of p~ospective jurors. They're going ~o make so8e 
selections. Eventually, they'll return that list to me, and 
I'll announce those who are going to be remaining as jurors 
and those who will be excused. 
While they're going through ~his process, I tend to 
take this time just to inform you a li ttle bit about the jury 
process, because there are some very comrron questions that 
people have. I'll address those questions. I know that 
people oftentimes thi~ks that a jury consists of 12 jurors, 
and that may be what happens because we watch movies, and 
read books, and watch TV shows. The reality is that most of 
the juries that are called are not 12. In Utah, we do 
rc~ervc the right to a 12-member j ur y panels, bu t chat's only 
for the most serious of all criminal types of cases. 
Generally speaking, ~ost juries consist of eight. Sometimes 
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juries might consist of six. We even have juries that 
consist of four jurors, and it depends on the nature of the 
issues that are being resolved and the severity of the crimes 
that are charged exactly how we determine the number of 
jurors. So in this case today, it will be an eight-man jury 
- an eight person jury. 
The other question that sometimes comes up is is it 
necessary for all of the jurors to agree, or is it adequate 
just to have a majority of the jurors? And I'll tell you 
that in a civil case, the majority of the jurors can make a 
determination. In a criminal case, it takes a unanimous 
verdict. All jurors must come to an agreement, and you've 
probably seen or heard or read about cases where they talk 
about a jury that can't come to a unanimous decision as being 
a hung jury. So in criminal cases, it does require that we 
have, however many jurors we have, that they come to a 
unanimous decision before we can announce a verdict, and 
that's part of the deliberation process, and I'll discuss 
that a little bit further when we get jury instructions to 
you. At this time, we really will just be waiting for 
counsel to make their decisions, and so we'll pass this time 
kind of quietly meditating. And when they're through, I'll 
proceed. 
(10:34:24 to 10:41:30 no proceedings) 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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I'll now call off the names of those who will 
remain as jurors. If I don't call your name, then in advance 
let me tell you thank you for the time that you have served. 
Your presence here has made it possible for us to seat a jury 
today. At an appropriate time, I will excuse those who are 
not remaining. But those who will remain when I excuse the 
others will be Mr. Manglesen, Ms. Sachra, Mr. Sperry, Ms. 
Prevost, Mr. Steel, Ms. Jones, Mr. Farr, and Mr. Durban. If 
I have not called your name, thank you very much for your 
time spent this morning allowing us to select this jury. 
We'll excuse you now and with our appreciation. Thank you. 
BAILIFF: All arise. 
(Whereupon the excused jurors left the courtroom). 
THE COURT: If I could have Ms. Jones, Mr. Farr, and 
Mr. Durban - if I could have the three of you come over here? 
I'll have my bailiff seat you. If you'll take - starting 
with Mr. Manglesen whose number one in the four chairs to the 
right on the back row and then the front row? 
(Whereupon the jury was seated) 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. 
Counsel, does ~his constitute the jury you 
selected? 
M~. ELDRIDGE: Yes , Yo ur Wnnn-. 
MR. HARMON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. I'm going to have the clerk 
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now take a mo~ent and have you all be adminislered a 
different oath. Previously, you took an oath to answer 
questions concerning your qualifications. Now, you're going 
to take an oath as the juror selected. It's a different 
oath. So listen to what it is she's asking you to say. 
Go aheaci. 
If you'd all rise and raise your right hand? 
(Whereupon the jury was sworn) 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. We're now 
going to take a brief recess. Tiat will allow you, if you 
need to, to make phone calls, to make arrangements, '+ l .L there 
are any that need to be made, stretch your legs, go to the 
restroom, get a drink. We'll start in in earnest with our 
evidence as soon as you retu ~n. :t's now almost quarter to 
11:00. 
Counsel, do wR need 10 or 15 minutes? What would 
you suggest? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Te n minutes should be enough. 
THS COURT: Ten minutes? If I could have everybody 
back here then at five minutes ~o 11:00, we'll begin our 
t rial at th a t time. 
During any re c ess, whethe~ it's t his one or any 
o the r, •••.•• ~ I ,,. ..-. j'-_iV.. .L·.:-:: ~ 'r-~, ,......,_; , t-' ; ) '' .· \ .( ,_. / 
about sports, weather, oublic interests, co,nmuni-r..y 
activities, Halloween, whatever you want. Just not about 
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this case, and you'll hear from me in just a moment other 
instructions I'll give you. You're not to discuss anything 
regarding this case with any of the parties, witnesses, or 
attorneys in the case, or my staff. You can always ask the 
bailiff if you need directions to facilities in the building, 
but not to discuss the case. Okay? With that in mind, we'll 
excuse the jury, and we'll be in recess for another 10 
minutes. 
THE COURT: The jury's excused. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom). 
THE COURT: Counsel, are there any items that you 
would like to place on the record before we begin? 
MR. HARMON: None from the defense. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: None. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess then for another 10 
minutes. Thank you. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COU~T: Thank you. The jury is back. Please be 
s ea-:ed. 
Membe rs of the jury, as you've returned to your 
sea t s, you'll see that we 've left a copy of pre l i minary jury 
fer ~{on on :.,,rour se a t. It's 
instruct you en the laws, not only as to the case, but also 
as to the procedures that we follow. So if you'll read along 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 1 3 20J~ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
DECLARATION OF 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS. 
No. 20130432-CA 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Case No. 101600146 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
I, Milton T. Harmon, declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the 
foregoing is true and correct: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. I 
represented Abisai Martinez-Castellanos in the above-referenced proceedings in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No. 101600146. 
2. I have reviewed portions of the record in the district court file including 
record excerpts relating to jury selection and the examination of witnesses. No transcript 
or report is available for three points in the proceedings. 
3. First, no transcript or report is available for portions of the jury voir 
dire and selection. The trial transcript indicates that during voir dire, the microphone 
was left open in the courtroom, "rendering the proceedings in chambers to be 
unintelligible" for approximately one hour of time-from 9:38:52 to 10:31:59. (Trial 
Transcript at 22.) As a result, there is no record of follow up questions to prospective 
jurors. 
4. I am providing this statement of the proceedings based on my best 
recollection. 
a. After Judge Brady asked general questions to the jury pool, he 
requested that Mr. Eldridge and I join him in chambers to ask follow up questions of 
selective venire members. (Trial Transcript at 21.) My client, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos, 
was not invited in chambers. 
b. While in chambers, Judge Brady went through the list of prospective 
jurors. He read each name and asked if either Mr. Eldridge or I had follow-up questions 
for the prospective juror. After the judge had compiled the list of individuals we wished 
to question, he invited each prospective juror on the list into chambers one at a time. 
c. Although I do not have a specific recollection of the circumstances 
surrounding the individual questioning of some of the prospective jurors, Judge Brady 
generally proceeded in the same fashion. He would explain the process to the prospective 
juror and then invite Mr. Eldridge or me to ask our questions. The prospective juror 
would answer and after we completed our questioning, Judge Brady asked the juror ifhe 
or she could be fair and impartial. The judge then excused the individual and asked if the 
attorneys had any objections or whether we passed the prospective juror for cause. 
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d. To the best of my recollection, the following prospective jurors were 
called into Judge Brady's chambers for questioning: Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra, 
Phil Sperry, Shelly Richardson, Brittany Laird, Rodney Steele, Lucy Jones, Gary Wood, 
Chet Farr, and Mitchell Durbin. There may have been others but I do not recall anything 
about them. 
e. I do not remember any particular in-chambers discussion between 
Judge Brady, Mr. Eldridge, and me about the individuals listed in paragraph 4.d. either 
before each individual entered the judge's chambers or after they left. I do remember 
generally why each prospective juror was called into chambers for further questioning. 
But I do not remember who asked the questions, I do not remember the specific 
questions, and I do not recall each prospective juror's answers. 
f. I do recall the following as to the list of prospective juror and the 
missing portions of the voir dire and jury selection. 
1. Judge Brady called Paul Mangelsori into chambers for further 
questioning . . Although I don' t remember who, someone expressed concern about Mr. 
Mangelson's many years of experience as a highway patrolman and his past involvement 
in so many jury trials. I do not remember any specific questions or answers, but Paul 
Mangelson would have assured us that he knew how to be fair, and that he could be fair, 
if selected as a juror. After Mr. Mangelson left the judge's chambers, I do not recall that 
we had any particular discussion about him although I recall that he was passed for cause. 
In addition, I did not object to Mr. Mangelson serving on the jury because he had been a 
supervisor on highway patrol when I was a district attorney for Juab County. I knew he 
3 I I· \ _'\ \..,, 1 
had done a lot of work on freeway stops and I thought he would hear the evidence of how 
this stop occurred and know that it was not proper. 
11. Judge Brady called prospective jurors into chambers because 
they indicated during general questioning that they were acquainted with someone in law 
enforcement. I believe those jurors included Phil Sperry, Brittney Laird, Rodney Steele, 
Lucy Jones, Gary Wood, and Mitchell Durbin, who had also served previously as a juror 
in a criminal case. For most of those individuals, I cannot recall what they were asked 
and I cannot recall their responses. I do not recall any of the details of Mr. Durbin's 
previous service as a juror. I do have some specific recollections about two of the 
prospective jurors-Phil Sperry and Lucy Jones. 
m. Phil Sperry disclosed that he is a good friend of Paul 
Mangelson and acquainted with law enforcement. I believe I asked if he could be fair and 
impartial. I do not recall anything else about Phil Sperry. 
1v. As to Lucy Jones, I recall that during in-chambers 
questioning, she was quite reluctant to disclose what was going on in her own mind. I 
recall that when Judge Brady asked whether she could be fair and impartial, she had 
reservations about her ability to function as a juror. Because of her reluctance, Judge 
Brady asked the question a second time, and Ms. Jones replied that she understood what 
the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror. After Ms. Jones left the 
judge's chambers, no one objected to her service as a juror and she was passed for cause. 
v. Four prospective jurors were called into chambers for 
questioning because they indicated they had been or were related to victims of crime or 
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were otherwise familiar with the criminal justice system. Those jurors included Carolyn 
Sachra, Phil Sperry, Shelly Richardson, and Chet Farr. I do not have any specific 
recollection of questioning those prospective jurors, but I do recall that Phil Sperry 
disclosed that his daughter had been a victim of crime and the crime occurred at his 
home. In addition, Shelly Richardson ran a business in town and she had been a victim of 
a crime. One of her employees committed theft. I believe Mr. Eldridge asked if she was 
satisfied with how his office had handled the case. I do not recall her answers. I believe 
Judge Brady asked if she could be fair and impartial and she said she could. Also, Chet 
Farr's son had been involved with criminal law either as a victim or perpetrator. I believe 
Mr. Eldridge asked if Mr. Farr was satisfied with how the prosecution handled the case. I 
do not recall Mr. Farr's answer. 
v1. After reviewing my notes, I recall that I exercised 4 
peremptory strikes to exclude the following individuals from the jury: Jeffrey Bradley, 
Kert Stevens, Ryan Greenhalgh, and Gary Wood. I have no recollection as to why I 
wanted any of these individuals excluded from the jury. 
5. I do not recall that I had any conversations with my client about any part of 
the jury selection process. He was not in chambers and not involved in the process. 
6. Second, no recording or transcript is available for several minutes 
after the court took a recess at the conclusion of Trooper Sheets's testimony and 
during a portion of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos's testimony. The record of the trial 
proceedings shows that from 2:13:02 to 2:47:43, for more than 34 minutes, the recording 
equipment was off. During that period, "a recess was taken." The trial transcript states 
5 .~· ~. - ,,. ·, ) \_;__·: ' · ... . :-:.: ~J 
the following: "Docket shows further examination of Mr. Sheets at 2:32 and testimony of 
Mr. Martinez-Castellanos starting at 2:34 indicating 15 minutes of lost court audio." 
(Trial Transcript at 126.) 
a. As to those proceedings, I have no recollection of whether a juror 
had a question of Trooper Sheets or whether Judge Brady asked a question on behalf of a 
juror after the recess. 
b. As to the missing portions of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos's direct 
examination, I do not recall specifics, but to the best of my recollection, I would have 
asked him his name, where he lived, how he came to possess the car he was driving, and 
how long he had owned the car before driving to Utah. I asked him to describe the 
condition of the car and whether he took time to clean it after buying it. I also asked 
whether he was aware of any drugs in the car; and I asked him to describe the drive and 
his encounter with the officer. 
C. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos answered 
as follows: 
i. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos lived in California. He worked in a 
warehouse and used box cutters and a pocket knife in his work. 
n. He had family in Utah and his brother was going to school 
here. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was proud of him. 
iii. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was traveling here for his brother's 
graduation. He needed a working car and he found one at a dealership. 
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1v. The dealer told him the car was recently brought in and the 
dealer did not have time to clean it. 
v. Although the car was quite cluttered, Mr. Martinez-
Castellanos decided to buy it to give to his brother as a gift. He paid $400 for the car. 
Also, he did not have time to clean it. 
vi. On June 9, 2010, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos left for Utah 
immediately after he worked a long shift at the warehouse. He did not pack much and he 
placed items in the console, including the box cutter, the pocketknife, a lighter and a 
marijuana grinder. 
v11. To keep himself alert, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos stopped at a 
truck stop/ gas station and purchased an energy drink for the drive, either Red Bull or 
Rock Stars. He drank the energy drink while he was on the road. 
viii. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos described how he was traveling 
northbound on I-15 and a Utah trooper was traveling southbound when the trooper made 
a U-tum with lights engaged to follow Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. In addition, he 
described how the trooper drove beside him and then pulled back behind Mr. Martinez-
Castellanos with his lights on to signal a traffic stop. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos pulled 
onto the shoulder of the interstate. 
ix. He described that later, after the trooper asked him to get out 
of the car, he told the trooper about his box cutter, the pocketknife, and his marijuana 
grinder and lighter in the console. He acknowledged to the officer that those items 
7 
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belonged to him and he explained that he had permission from a California doctor to use 
medical marijuana, where it is legal in that state. 
x. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos testified that other items found in 
the car, including a white substance wrapped in paper, pills, cellophane with residue, a 
twist, and a glass pipe with white residue did not belong to him. 
x1. He explained that many of the items in the car were there 
along with the clutter when he purchased the car. 
d. I observed from the trial transcript that when the recording starts 
again after recess, the discussion on the record concerns a certain Exhibit 14--my client's 
medical marijuana prescription. I do not recall how this discussion was initiated, nor do I 
remember any conversations on or off the record involving this exhibit. 
7. Third, no recording or transcript is available for a post-trial 
conference in Judge Brady's chambers. My best recollection of those proceedings is as 
follows: 
a. After the trial, I filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. I did not file a memorandum supporting this motion because I did not have time 
to prepare one. As a public defender, I have a very high case load. 
b. Sometime after I filed my motion, during a regular court session, 
Judge Brady asked the prosecutor and me to join him in chambers to discuss concerns he 
had with the jury trial. Once in chambers, the judge voiced two concerns. First, the 
judge expressed concern that Paul Mangelson served on the jury and that I did not strike 
him. Second, the judge expressed concern that the trooper who testified at trial may not 
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have had a legal justification for a search and seizure. Judge Brady was also concerned 
that I did not do more at the trial to bring this fact to light. 
c. Although Judge Brady gave both the prosecutor and me an 
opportunity to respond, I do not recall what, if anything, either of us said. 
d. I later learned that Judge Brady spoke to another public defender, 
Tate Bennett, and he asked Mr. Bennett to prepare an amicus brief for the court. 
Executed on this /~'!"' day of February, 2014. 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the l-0.\v--day of February, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Declaration of Milton T. Harmon to be served on the following via 
first-class mail, postage prepaid: 
Laura B. Dupaix 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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Defendant/ Appellant. 
DECLARATION OF 
JARED W. ELDRIDGE 
No. 20130432-CA 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Case No. 101600146 
I, Jared W. Eldridge, declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the 
foregoing is true and correct: 
1. I am County Attorney for Juab County and duly licensed to practice law in 
the State of Utah. I represented the State of Utah in the above-referenced proceedings in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No. 101600146. 
2. I have reviewed portions of the record in the district court file including 
record excerpts relating to jury selection and the examination of witnesses and my notes. 
No transcript or report is available for two points in the proceedings. 
3. First, no transcript or report is available for portions of the jury vofr 
dire and selection. After Judge Brady asked general questions of the jury pool, he 
requested that counsel join him in chambers to ask follow up questions of selective venire 
members. (Trial Transcript at 21.) At that point, the trial transcript indicates that during 
voir dire, the microphone was left open in the courtroom, "rendering the proceedings in 
chambers to be unintelligible" for approxi~ately one hour of time-from 9:38:52 to 
10:31 :59'. (Trial Transcript at 22.) As a result, there is no record of follow up questions 
to prospective jurors. 
4. I am providing this statement of the proceedings based on my best 
recollection. 
5. I believe that while we were in chambers, Judge Brady went down the list 
of prospective jurors and asked the attorneys if they had questions for anyone on the list. 
Ifwe did, the judge would call that person into chambers for questioning. The in-
chambers proceedings then continued generally as follows. 
6. Either Mr. Harmon or I would ask the prospective juror our questions and 
after he or she answered, the judge would excuse the individual and ask Mr. Hannon and 
me if we had any concerns with this particular person serving on the jury. If we did not 
express concerns, that individual remained on the jury list and Judge Brady called the 
next person into chambers for further questioning. 
a. I believe Judge Brady called juror number one, Jeffry Bradley, into 
chambers. Although I do not recall anything about Mr. Bradley, I believe he disclosed 
that a family member was charged with a crime. I may have asked about his experience 
with the criminal justice system and whether he felt either that he was treated fairly or 
that his family member was treated fairly. I do not have a specific recollection of his 
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answers. Because I did not object to him, I believe he expressed that he felt the process 
was fair. Ifhe had answered otherwise, after Mr. Bradley left chambers I would have 
asked the judge to strike him for cause. 
b. I believe Judge Brady next called Paul Mangelson into chambers for 
further questioning. I recall that the questions involved his work as a trooper for 
approximately 40 years and his assignments relating to drug interdiction. I may have 
asked Mr. Mangelson if, in his capacity as a sergeant, he supervised Trooper John Sheets. 
He disclosed that he knew Trooper Sheets but did not supervise him. I believe Mr. 
Harmon asked Mr. Mangelson ifhe would give Trooper Sheets's testimony more weight. 
Also, the judge may have asked follow-up questions, but I do not recall. I do recall that 
Mr. Mangelson said he would make up his mind based on the facts presented in court and 
he would not give the officer's testimony more weight. After Mr. Mangelson left, he 
remained on the list of jurors as I had no reason to ask the judge to strike him. 
c. Judge Brady next called Carolyn Sachra into chambers for further 
questioning. She indicated she was a victim of rape. In addition, her son had been 
prosecuted in California for drugs. She said she was against drugs. She also said that if a 
person had drugs in the car, they were probably guilty. After Ms. Sachra left, I do not 
recall any conversation about striking her for cause. 
d. Judge Brady called Phil Sperry into chambers. He has multiple 
sclerosis and I recall we had a conversation about his cane because the handle is a 
baseball. Mr. Sperry is in Mr. Harmon's LDS Ward. Either he or Mr. Harmon disclosed 
they had known each other for years. I believe I asked whether Mr. Sperry could make a 
3 -~"' '7 • l); - .. i - ~---
decision based on the facts and not on his relationship with Mr. Harmon. I may have 
asked, "if you thought the evidence was sufficient, if you thought the client was guilty, 
would you feel you have to explain yourself to Mr. Harmon?" I recall that he answered 
no. Also, Mr. Sperry revealed that his daughter was a dispatcher in law enforcement. I 
believe I would have asked if he would consider a witness in law enforcement to be more 
credible. I believe he would have said no. Mr. Sperry also disclosed that he was a victim 
of crime or he was related to a victim, but I do not remember the crime. I may have asked 
him whether he felt that the criminal justice system worked or whether it left a bad taste 
in his mouth. I believe he gave an innocuous answer. 
e. Judge Brady called Stacey Provost into chambers. She is a widow. 
She indicated she is a former drug user. Although she had used methamphetamine and 
pain medications, she had been clean for 6 years. I believe I asked whether she had an 
opinion about legalizing drugs. She expressed that medical marijuana should be okay. 
f. Judge Brady called Shelly Richardson into chambers. I do not recall 
the specifics but believe she knew Mr. Harmon socially. 
g. Judge Brady called Brittney Laird into chambers. During the in-
chambers discussion, it came out that her ex-husband is a former highway patrolman. He 
worked with Paul Mangelson and John Sheets, and he left the force under a cloud of 
suspicion. He has had issues with substance abuse. I believe I asked her questions about 
prosecuting him for violating a protective order. Also, I believe someone asked her 
whether she knew Mr. Mangelson or Trooper John Sheets. I do not recall her answers 
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although I believe she would have said that she would make a decision in the case based 
on the facts. 
h. Judge Brady called Rodney Steele into chambers. During the 
discussion, he indicated he had been convicted twenty-two years ago of poaching. I do 
not have a specific recollection, but I believe he expressed he was treated fairly. 
1. Judge Brady called Lucy Jones into chambers. During the 
discussion, it came out that she is either related to or close friends with the Chief of 
Police for Nephi City, Mike Morgan. I believe someone asked whether that relationship 
would cause her to give more credibility to law enforcement. I do not recall her answer 
but believe she said it would not influence her. 
J. Judge Brady called Gary Wood into chambers. It came out that Mr. 
Wood had social relationships with the attorneys and associations with law enforcement. 
He served as an LDS bishop when I served as an LDS Stake Young Men's President and 
Mr. Hannon was Stake Sunday School President. I believe I asked whether Mr. Wood's 
relationships and associations would cause him to lean one way or another; whether he 
would feel a need to justify himself if he believed the evidence was not sufficient to 
convict; and whether he would consider testimony from law enforcement to be more 
credible than testimony from a fay witness. I do not recall his answers but I believe he 
answered no. 
k. I believe Judge Brady called Debra Barnes into chambers. She 
disclosed that her daughter was a victim of sexual assault. I believe we talked about that. 
I would have asked about her feelings for the prosecution and whether the sexual assault 
5 f_-... _,; _,... ; : ., - ___ ... . \ _ ., 
case left a bad taste in her mouth. I do not remember her response, but I recall it did not 
cause me to be concerned in any way. 
L Judge Brady called Chet Farr into chambers. His son had been 
criminally charged. I believe I asked whether he felt his son was treated fairly. Mr. Farr 
answered, yes, that his son should be held accountable for what he had done. 
m. Judge Brady also called Mitchell Durbin into chambers. I know Mr. 
Durbin as a referee for church basketball~ Mr. Durbin may also have an association with 
Mr. Harmon or law enforcement. I do not recall anything in particular about the in-
chambers discussion with Mr. Durbin. 
7. After we completed the in-chambers voir dire with the prospective jurors, 
the judge would have asked whether we passed each prospective juror for cause. I do not 
have a specific recollection of that conversation, but that is how the judge normally 
would proceed. I recall we had a discussion as to whether we needed to talk to any 
additional prospective jurors or if we had enough jurors to exercise peremptory 
challenges and to seat an eight-person jury. We all agreed that we had talked to enough 
prospective jurors. The judge then asked whether we passed the panel for cause, and he 
requested that we return to the courtroom to finish jury selection. 
8. Second, no recording or transcript is available for several minutes 
after the court took a recess at the conclusion of Trnoper Sheets's testimony and 
during portions of Mr. Martinez-Castell.anos's testimony. The record of the trial 
proceedings shows that from 2:13:02 to 2:47:4-3, for more than 34 minutes, the recording 
equipment was off. During that period, "a recess was taken." The trial transcript states 
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the following: "Docket shows further examination of Mr. Sheets at 2:32 and testimony of 
Mr. Martinez-Castellanos starting at 2:34 indicating 15 minutes of lost court audio." 
(Trial Transcript at 126.) 
9. I have reviewed the transcript pages at issue and my best recollection is as 
follows. 
a. After the recess, Judge Brady advised us that a juror asked to read 
the toxicology report. I requested that exhibits 2 and 3 be published to the jury for them 
to review. I then announced to the court that the State would rest. 
b. As to the missing portions of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos's direct 
examination, my best recollection is that he testified to the following: 
1. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was driving from California to Salt 
Lake City for his brother's graduation. He had been on the road for 12-13 hours. 
11. He had worked in a warehouse for 9 or 10 hours before 
traveling to Utah. 
iii. He did not pack much. 
1v. He drove an Acura that he had purchased possibly from an 
auction or from a used car dealer a month earlier. It was trashy inside. He did not clean it. 
Nevertheless, he was taking it to his brother as a graduation present. 
v. The registration showed that the car had been registered three 
months earlier. 
(.~•. 
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vi. With the exception of items used for marijuana, including a 
grinder and lighter which Mr. Martinez-Castellanos admitted belonged to him, he denied 
knowing anything about drugs or drug items in the car. 
vii. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos has problems with his back. He saw 
a doctor and had a prescription for Percocet but did not like it. He was under doctor's 
orders to use medical marijuana. 
viii. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos described how on June 9, 2010, he 
was northbound on the interstate. A patrol car was traveling in the opposite direction with 
emergency lights on, and as the cars reached the same point, the officer made a U-tum. 
The officer quickly approached Mr. Martinez-Castellanos from behind with his 
emergency lights on. The officer continued northbound driving beside Mr. Martinez-
Castellanos' scar. He then turned off his overhead lights, turned them on again and pulled 
behind Mr. Martinez-Castellanos for the stop. 
1x. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos kept the car registration in the 
glove box. 
10. I have attached my notes for jury selection and for Mr. Martinez-
Castellanos' s direct examination. 
Executed on this \7 day of February, 2014. 
~~lG 
Jared W. ~ldri'dge 
Juab Coun'ty Attorney 
----------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the J1_ day of February, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Declaration of Jared W. Eldridge to be served on the following via first-
class mail, postage prepaid: 
Laura B. Dupaix 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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Defendant 
Notebook: cases 
Created: 11/1/2012 1:35 PM 
Location: Juab Countv. Utah. United States 
Goina to SLC 
Brother araduated 
Travelina from CA 
TRAVELING 12-13 hrs 
Workina in a warehouse 
Worked 9-10 hrs before left to utah 
Didn't oack much 
Drove Acura 
Had car 1 mo. (Reaistration shows 3 mos) 
Purchased vehide from used car dealer 
Trashv inside 
Did not clean the car 
Not aware of druas in car 
Uodated: 11/1/2012 2:15 PM 
Troooer came uo behind him quick, pulled beside him turned off lights 
Had iust reaistered 
Keot reaistration in alove box 
Cleaned alove box & center console 
Has had oroblems w / back 
Had Percocet didn't like 
Back oroblems 
Saw a Dr. 
Beaan usina mariiuana as a result of Dr. 
Person traded in 2 days before he purchasedwasnot using meth or hydrocodone 
Redirect 
Would put knives in console for work 
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NEPHI , UTAH - OCTOBER 28, 2010 
JUDGE JAMES BRADY 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We have a 1:30 suppression hearing . Mr. 
Harmon and the defendant - it's State of Utah vs . Abisai 
Martinez-Castellanos. And Ms. Howard, you do have your 
witness here now? Is that correct? 
MS . HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor . 
THE COURT: Let's go ahead and proceed with the 
suppression hearing . 
MS. HOWARD: We call Trooper Sheets. 
JOHN SHEETS 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Could you hold on for just one second, 
Ms. Howard? 
MS. HOWARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: I wanted to make certain. I don't 
believe I heard the preliminary hearing, but I do recall that 
I had Mr. Martinez in my courtroom recently. I was trying to 
remember - oh, we were just at a pretrial conference. That's 
fine. Thank you . 
Ill 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. HOWARD: 
Q Would you please state your name? 
A Trooper John Sheets. 
Q And what is your occupation? 
A A trooper at the Utah Highway Patrol. 
Q Were you working within Juab County on or about 
June 9 th , 2010? 
A 
Q 
defendant? 
A 
Q 
A 
shirt. 
Q 
I was. 
On that date did you come in contact with the 
Yes. 
And you recognize him here today? 
Yes, sitting at the table with a gray and black 
Okay, thank you. Would you please state for the 
court your training and experience with drug interdiction and 
detection? 
A I've been on the Utah Highway Patrol drug and 
interdiction squad since 2001. I've been an officer for 
about 20 years in various capacities. I've been through 
numerous training classes associated with the interdiction 
squad - Deseret Snow, many classes put on by the state as 
well as the federal DLT. And then Rocky Mountain High, I've 
been through several classes with them. 
2 
-·--··-···-·-·······------··---··----- ·· ·--··---··-·-··- - --- --~-"'--·------ ----------------------~ 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
------- ...... .,. -· -----•-··-----·------· 
Q Okay. And you've been on the drug interdiction 
team for how long did you say? 
A 2001. 
Q 2001? As part of the drug interdiction squad or 
team, do you familiarize yourself with adjacent state's laws? 
A Yes. Not just interdiction, but just regular 
patrol. 
Q Okay. 
A You know, we - working the Highway Patrol, you deal 
with a lot of people from out-of-state coming through. So 
you have to be familiar with, like Window 10, and 
registration, and what they're required, and so we can 
enforce the laws. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Front plate -
Yes. 
- requirements and things of that nature? 
That's correct. 
Does that include experience with the California -
A Yes. California is one of our major - it's a close 
state. So a lot of people coming through are from California 
as well as Arizona and Nevada. 
Q Okay. All right. On this date in question, would 
yo u state for the court how it is you came in contact with 
the defendant? 
A I observed a gold Acura traveling northbound and 
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when it passed me, it appeared to only have one sticker on 
it. California plates are fairly legible. They have two 
stickers - one month, one year on each side, and they're 
fairly - you know, they're good. They're visible. So you 
can see them. I wish all the states were like that -
Q 
A 
Yeah. 
- so you can - but this one only had one, and I'm 
familiar with California. They require two, the month and a 
year. So I pu l led out and stopped it . 
Q Okay. Did you take - after the fact, did you take 
a picture of the vehicle? 
Yes. 
A front picture as well as a rear picture of the -
That's correct -
- of the vehicle? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A - as well as the plates so you could see that there 
was no - the missing sticker wasn't there. 
Q 
state? 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay. And you provided a copy of that to the 
Yes. 
Is that correct? 
Yes. 
MS. HOWARD: Your Honor, may I approach with 
Plaintiff's Exhibit l? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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Q (BY MS. HOWARD) I have what's been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and ask you if you can identify this. 
A These are the pictures I took of the car, and then 
of the driver so I can remember him in court . 
Q Okay . This first picture - can you state what that 
is - the one that's in the upper left hand corner? 
A Okay. This is the license plate I took, and this 
is the plate that was on the car - the California plate. You 
can see it's only got the year sticker on there and the -
where the month's suppose to be, you can see it either fell 
off, or was taken off, or . . . 
Q Okay . And you have - did you alter or change these 
pictures in any way? 
A No. Those are the pictures I took on the scene. 
Q Do they accurately reflect the scene as you saw it 
that day? 
A Yes. 
MS. HOWARD: May I approach, Your Honor, with this 
Exhibit 1? 
counsel? 
THE COURT: Has it been shown to the defense 
MS. HOWARD: Yes, it has, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MS. HOWARD: I'd like to offer. 
THE COURT: Any objections? 
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MR. HARMON: Not for this hearing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. For purposes of this 
hearing, the exhibit - Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 will be 
received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 received) 
MS. HOWARD: Okay, thank you. 
Q (BY MS. HOWARD) So you pursued and stopped this 
vehicle for that violation? Is that -
That's correct. 
Okay. What happened next? 
A 
Q 
A I approached the vehicle and advised the driver why 
I was stopping him. He was missing his month sticker. He 
appeared to be a little bit, you know, surprised that it 
wasn't on there. He provided me the registration and an 
expired Colorado driver's license, and then I looked at the 
registration and observed that the registration - the year 
sticker should have been 2011, cause it expired in March of 
2011. So he didn't even have the proper year sticker on the 
plate. 
Q 
A 
Q 
So the plate was expired as well; is that correct? 
Yes. 
Okay. And -
A Well, according to the registration, it was 
properly registered, but the sticker is - the proper stickers 
weren't put on it yet. 
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Q Okay. So what you saw - and I should rephrase that 
then. What you saw on the plate showed that the plate itself 
was showing an improper registration? Is that correct? 
A Yes. It only had the 2010 . It didn ' t have the 
month. So I didn't know what month it expired in 2010, and 
it should have been - had a February - or a March there -
sticker there. So according to the - if it hadn't this month 
sticker on there - according to what was on the plate, it 
would have been shown to be expired. 
Expired plates; is that correct? 
Yes. 
Q 
A 
Q Okay. And so you discover that he has an expired 
Cali - Colorado driver's license as well as expired 
registration stickers on the plate; is that correct? 
A Yes. A 2010 sticker was on there. The 2011 
sticker wasn't placed on there yet . 
Q Okay. What happened at that point? 
A He said he had a valid Utah license. He just 
didn't have it with him, and then we discussed the, and then 
I told him the month sticker - or the year sticker wasn't on 
there. And then the month sticker wasn't on there either. 
So he - we had a conversation about that, and I believe that 
he stated it fe l l o f f or somebody took it. I wasn't sure 
exactly. 
Q Okay. So up to that point, what violations of law 
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did you · see? 
A The improper display. 
Q Okay. 
A Plus he gave me an expired driver's l i cense. 
Q Okay. While you were talking to him then, did you 
notice anything about him that was suspicious to you? 
A Yes. He was a little bit jittery. He had jittery 
speech and fast speech, and it made me a little bit concerned 
that he might have been on some type of stimulant. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A stimulant? 
Yes, based on what I saw. 
What did you do at that point? 
A Went back to my car, ran checks, and determined 
that he did have a valid Utah license, and then that the 
registration was actually suppose to be 3-2011. He just 
didn't have the stickers on there like he was suppose to 
have. He didn't have his drivers license with him like he 
was suppose to have. So - and then I also ran a criminal 
history check on him like - while we were running checks on 
him. 
Q And what did you discover for purposes of this 
hearing today? 
A He had a criminal history including drug offenses, 
which heightened my suspicions that he might be on the 
influence of something based on what I saw and in his 
~---- --------·"·--
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criminal history. 
Q You said that he had rapid speech and rapid and 
jittery movements. 
A Yes . 
Q Was that more or less than what you'd expect based 
upon nervousness of a driver? 
A Well, this wasn't nervousness. It was just -
there's a difference. When you're jittery and you're talking 
really fast, it - based on my training and my experience as a 
police officer and dealing with thousands of cars that I've 
stopped in my career, this made me more like it was - he was 
under the influence of something. 
Q Okay. Then what course of action did you take 
next? 
A I went back to the car and had him step out. I 
advised him that I was going to have him do field sobriety 
tests, cause he was what I called - told him he was bouncing 
around a little bit. 
Q 
A 
And what test did you have him perform? 
Well, first of all, I asked him if he had any 
weapons for my safety, and he said that there's some knives 
in the car. 
Q Okay. And did you retrieve those at that point, or 
did you -
A Yes. And the - I advised him - I had determined 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
2 3 
24 
25 
----------
that he was a convicted felon. So the weapon - when he said 
he had weapons in the ~ar, that kind of raised my suspicions 
of whether he's - he was going to be restricted or not. 
Determine what size of the knife it was. If it was a little 
teeny one, or a kitchen knife, or something. 
Q Okay. And this was after you checked the criminal 
history; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
felon? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Okay. And you had determined he was a convicted 
Yes. 
And then you asked him out of the vehicle? 
Yes, to do some field sobriety tests. 
Q And that's when he told that he had weapons in the 
vehicle? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
He had knives in the car in the center console. 
And did you retrieve them at that point? 
Yes. 
Did you look any further in the vehicle, or did you 
just retrieve the knives? 
A Well, I found the knives, and then I believe - I'll 
have to read the report here. Okay. Yeah, I retrieved the 
kn i ves . 
Q 
A 
And what sizes were they? 
Just medium-sized knives. They weren't the little 
10 
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tiny ones that you'd put in your pocket. They were a little 
bit - the bigger ones. 
Q But you didn't search the vehicle any further at 
that point; is that correct? 
A Well, the knives were in the center console where 
he said they were, and then there was some - like a marijuana 
grinder in there shaped like a hand grenade. So I believe I 
had him do the field sobriety test to begin with. 
Q The field sobriety tests were first? 
Yes. 
Okay. 
A 
Q 
A Well, I found the knives first, and then I had him 
do some field sobriety tests. I've got to read my report 
here. 
Q Okay. We'll give you just a second to refresh your 
recollection. 
A Yeah. I did the reports - or did the field 
sobriety tests on the scene. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Field sobriety tests on the scene? 
Yes. 
Before or after the knives were found? 
Before - or after. Excuse me. 
After the field sobriety tests? 
Yes. 
Okay. So just so that this is clear, you checked 
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his criminal history, you'd noted the traffic violations, and 
then you went back and had him perform field sobriety tests; 
is that correct? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And at that point, there were no searches of the 
vehicle? You were still investigating? 
A I didn't do the inventory yet. I believe I took 
the knife out first - and found the knife first, and then had 
him do field sobriety tests, and then I went back to do the 
big search. 
Q Okay. 
A But when I pulled the knife out, I saw the 
marijuana grinder, cause it was in the same pot. 
Q Okay. But you didn't seize it at that point; is 
that correct? 
A No. They stayed in the car, I believe. 
Q Okay. What - after you - he told you there was a 
knife, and so you retrieved that; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
Uh-huh (affirmative), yes. 
After you retrieved it, then did you have him 
perform the field sobriety tests? 
Yes. 
Okay. Wh ich test did you have him perform? 
A 
Q 
A The first test I gave him was the eye gaze, and he 
had lack of convergence in both eyes. 
12 
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A 
Q 
A 
--- -·-----•-·· ~- -----
Okay. 
And then I gave him the Rhornberg. 
And what did you note on the Rhornberg? 
One inch front to back sway, and he estimated 30 
seconds in 36 seconds, and he had the eyelid tremors. 
Q I don't believe in this hearing that we've covered 
your training, Officer, as a drug recognition expert. If you 
could state that for the record? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I'm a DRE as well as a DRE instructor. 
Okay. And you've been a DRE for how many years? 
Since 2004. 
2004? And an instructor for how many years? 
2006. 
And your currently still certified for both; is 
that correct? 
A Yes . I just sent off my stuff this year - this 
week - or this - to get re-certified. So -
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
- all this stuff's coming in. 
The Rhomberg is a DRE test; is that correct? 
Yes. 
Okay. And you said that you noticed a sway? 
Yes. 
Of how far? 
One inch. 
13 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay. And what happens next? 
And then he had the eyelid tremors. 
Are those also a DRE test? 
Yeah, there's a clue on the Rhomberg. 
Sure, okay. Q 
A Plus an indication of drug use. And then the walk 
and turn, his number three steps he had his arms up and 
stopped before the turn in a military turn. 
Q And what was the next test? 
A The one-leg stand. He had a swaying balance, and 
he counted to 23 in 30 seconds, and then I took his pulse. 
It was 108, which is high. Sixty and 90 is normal. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
And did you check his eyes? 
Yes. 
And what did you notice about those? 
He had the red eyed conjunctiva. 
Based upon your training and experience, wha t is 
t h at indicative of? 
A 
Q 
,IJ., 
Q 
The main thing it's the marijuana use. 
Okay. Any other test tja t you had h im perform? 
Wel l , those are the fou r I did . 
Okay. Bas ed upon the evidence yo u found at the 
scer:e - hi s - vo;_i r con ve .csat.::.o,: wit h him a::id any thing that 
was - you saw on the field sobriety tests, did you form a~ 
opinion as to whether or not he was driving under the 
14 
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influence of a drug or that he was under - driving with a 
rnetabola o f a drug in his system? 
A Yes. So he was placed under arrest for that and 
the weapons violation. 
Q 
arrested? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay . What happened - so at that point, he was 
Yes . 
On the scene? 
Yes. 
And was his rights read to him there? 
No. 
And you didn't interview him any further there? 
No . 
Okay. What did you do after he was arrested? 
I went back to search the car. 
Was that pursu - what was that pursuant to? 
I did an inventory. It could have been a 
contraband search, cause there was a knife. And then when I 
was getting the knife out - check - or checking the knife, he 
said he had - I saw the marijuana or grinder in the console 
with the knives. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay. Did you use an inventory form? 
Yes. 
Okay. 
Well, the state tax form, which is also an 
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inventory form. 
Q A~d that - is that - was that following procedure 
for an inventory? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
And it's completed there? 
Yes. 
MS. HOWARD: Does the Court wish to see that? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. HOWARD: May I approach? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. HOWARD: May I app~oach with Plaintiff's Exhibit 
2? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (BY MS. HOWARD) I have what's been marked 
Plaintiff's Exh ibit 2 and ask you if you can identify this? 
This is a copy of the inven - or the - here's the 
original here on front, and this is a copy of the inven - the 
state tax/inventory form. 
Q 
A 
Q 
wh a'.: ,,as 
A 
A 
And where was this filled out at? 
At t he scene. 
Okay. And s o ail of the writ:ing on 
done at the scene; is that c o rre c t? 
Yeah . 
Not~i n g fu rther wa s a d ded once yo u -
I don't believe so. 
here is from 
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2. 
Q 
A 
Q 
- [inaudible]? Okay . 
Yeah . 
MS. HOWARD : I'd like to offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 
THE COURT: Any objections, Mr. Harmon? 
MR . HARMON : Not for this hearing. 
THE COURT: Thank you . It ' ll be received . 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received) 
MS . HOWARD: Thank you, Your Honor . 
(BY MS . HOWARD) On that fo r m then that you have 
also in front of you as well as the Court - as you inventory 
the vehicl e , what did you do with that form? 
A Well, I take it up to the car. And as I find 
stuff, I write the belongings on the first line, and then I 
write the damage that's on the second line. 
Q Okay. So you're noting the exterior of the 
vehicle? 
Yes. 
And then what happened? 
A 
Q 
A And while I'm doing this, I'm looking for the con -
taking whatever contraband. Based on finding marijuana - or 
the marijuana grinder. So I'm also looking for contraband 
too. 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
And the knife, of course. 
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Q 
A 
And so what did you find in that vehicle? 
Well, in that same console, there was I believe the 
two knives that he said he had, and then there was the 
marijuana grinder. It was shaped like a little hand grenade, 
and then there was a little - another little hand grenade 
looking thing. I had to ask him what it was, and he said it 
was a lighter. So there's the marijuana grinder shaped like 
a hand grenade. The lighter is shaped like a hand grenade in 
the center console, and then I found some other things. 
. Q And what were those things? 
A There was a bindle containing a white, crystal like 
substance under the center console. It was between the 
center con - sticking out kind of on the center console on 
the driver's side seat, and the substance tested positive for 
meth. And there was also a cellophane like you wrap the 
cigarette paper - or cigarette box cellophane, and it 
contained three oblong, white pills, and it was also under 
the console with - next to the other substance, and these 
were identified as Hydrocodone. 
Q Okay. 
A And the two - like I said, the two knives were 
located in the center console, and there was a cellophane 
wrapper with seven pills under the left front driver's seat, 
and these were just not prescription, non-scheduled anti-
seizure medication. 
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Q 
A 
Okay. 
And a glass pipe with a burnt residue was under the 
.left - up underneath the driver's seat, and a black case with 
a pipe was located in the glove box, and three twists with a 
residue were located on the right front floorboard. 
Q So all of these things that were found, Officer, 
were found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle? 
A That's correct. 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
Nothing was located in the trunk. No contraband 
was located in the trunk. 
Q All right. After you did your inventory of the 
vehicle, did you sign your form indicating that you had 
completed it? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
And did you send that into the state? 
It was given a copy to the record driver. 
Okay. 
And then we sent - have a copy of it . 
Okay. What happened when -
And then he gets a copy of it too. 
Okay. The - he meaning the -
The defendant -
- defendant? 
- yes. 
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Q Okay. And you complied with those requirements and 
distributed those copies? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A 
Okay. What happened next then? 
The tow came and took the car, and he was - the 
defendant was transported to jail. I read him the 
admonitions, and he refused to take - I asked him to take a 
urine test, and he refused to take a urine test. 
Q Where is it that you read him the chemical test 
admonition? 
A It's on the DUI form. 
Q 
A 
Where were you located? 
Oh. We were at the jail. 
Q Okay. As you went through the form, did you fill 
it in as you proceeded -
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
- to read it to him? 
Yes. 
So if it's marked that you told him he was under 
the arrest - under arrest, was that done there at the jail? 
that? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Okay. And the next - what was his response to 
He said, Yes, sir. Know - understanding that he 
was under arrest for that. 
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Q Okay. And then you told him that - oh, what did 
you tell him next? 
A Then I read him - I'd like him to submit to a urine 
and blood test, and then I read him the first admonition. 
Q Okay. And what was his statement to you during 
that reading - after that reading of the admonition? 
A 
Q 
A 
~I'm going to hold off. I smoke marijuana." 
Then did you read him the refusal admonition? 
Yes. 
Q And once again, what is the time marked to the side 
of the second -
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Twelve - 12:38 in the afternoon. 
For the refusal admonition? 
Yes. 
Prior to that, it's 12:36 for the first admonition? 
Yes. 
Q Okay. And you read to him the entire refusal 
admonition? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
And what was his response to that? 
"I'm denying it. My rights are being violated.n 
So what did you do then at that point? 
And I also read him the counsel admonition. 
At the same time? 
About a minute later. 
21 
- ---------~--••---M- --•---~--------~ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
J.1 
12 
13 
1-1 
1 C: 
.L .J 
7 6 
~ 7 
18 
19 
2 0 
21 
22 
23 
25 
Q A rrinute later? You read to him - that admonition 
is recorded at 12:39? 
A Yes. 
Q And what is that one? 
A That's the right to counsel. Just to inform him of 
- he doesn't have the right to refuse and - or the right to 
counsel and all that stuff. 
Q Could you read that for the record? What it says 
there? 
A "Your right to remain silent, and your right to 
counsel do not apply - do not apply to imply consent law 
which is civil in nature and separate from the criminal 
charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you the 
right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right 
to counsel during ates~ procedure. Unless you submit to the 
test, I'm re questing and I wj_J] consider that you have 
~efused to take the test. I warn you that if you refuse to 
take the test, your drivi~g privilege can be revoked with no 
provisions for limited driving.n 
Okay. What did you do then a t tjat point? Q 
A I 2:"ead him that, and he still didn't want to do it 
- g i ve the test. So I obtained - I advised him I was going 
to co cet a - o btain a war rant, a nd I did. 
Q Okay. And you filled in a search warrant; is that 
correct? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Yes . 
And that warrant was heard by which judge? 
Judge Eyre. 
Q And what was the result of you applying for that 
warrant? 
A He signed it and gave it to me. 
Q Okay. And then what happens next? 
A I went back to the jail. I advised him I had a 
warrant and gave him the thing he - the copy he needed, and 
then I believe Trooper Housekeeper came and conducted a blood 
draw. 
MS. HOWARD: If I may have just a minute, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. HOWARD: That's all I have for this hearing, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Harmon, do you have questions? 
MR. HARMON: Yes. We have some, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARMON: 
Q Officer, after you stopped the defendant, did you 
ever take him back to the back of his vehicle to show him the 
license plate and the condition of the stickers? 
A He was back there, yes, cause that's where we did 
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the field sobriety tests. 
Q And did he - did you show him the stickers where 
they were missing? 
A To tell you the truth, I can't believe - I can't 
remember if I did or not, but he was back there. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. 
And we were back there. 
But when you initially told him that the stickers 
were missing, that was a puzz~e to him, wasn't it? 
A Yes. He said it must have fallen off or ... Well, 
first I told him about the month sticker, cause I didn't run 
the plate. So I didn't know - or see the registration. So I 
don't k~ow if it was expired or not. So we were just talking 
about the month sticke r . And then when he handed me the 
regi stration and 1 showed - and it showed that it should have 
been 2011, I advised h im - yeah, you're missing both of them. 
Q You were able to co~firm t hro ug h the records that 
h e did - that the vehicle was validly registered to him? 
A Yes. It exp~red on three of 2011, but h e just had 
the 2010 s ticke r on the plate. 
Q 
Q 
Okay. And who did the vehicle belong to? 
Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. 
Okay. And so you were able to confirm that h e 
woul d have been confused ass~ning that he had it properly 
registe.::-ed? 
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A I don't know if he was confused or not. It was 
properly registered, yes. 
Q And you also were able to confirm that he did have 
a valid driver's license? 
A Yes. He didn't have it with him, but he had a 
valid one. 
Q Okay. You indicated that you searched in the 
vehicle and searched the center console. What was the reason 
for conducting that search? 
A He is a convicted felon and said he had knives in 
the car. 
Okay. And did you ask him to get them for you? Q 
A No, not at that point. He's a convicted felon, and 
I don't want him grabbing knives on me. That's an officer 
safety thing. 
Q Did your record check show what he was convicted -
the charge he was convicted of? 
A Yes. But offhand, I couldn't tell you. I know he 
had several drug charges. 
Q Okay. None related to violence? 
A I don't recall what they were . 
Q Okay. Did you seize the weapon - the knife? 
A I got both of them, yes. 
Q Okay. And you say that they were medium-sized. 
About how long would the blade be on the knife? 
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A 
Q 
A 
.. ---- -- ----------
Between two and four inches. 
Between two and four? 
Yes. They were - like I said, they weren't the 
small - the really small ones, and they weren't the big ones. 
So they - I would say that they were the medium-sized ones. 
Q Would they be like a pocket knife that a carpenter 
would carry? 
A I don't know. 
Q Or that a handy person would carry around -
A They're just 
Q - the house? 
A - typical knives people carry around with them. 
Q Okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Harmon, let me ask you a question 
that hasn't been - it may have been stated. I'm just not 
clear on it. Are we talking about a f6lding type knife, or 
are we talking about a fixed blade knife? 
THE WITNESS: It's a folding one. 
THE COURT: Okay. And when you say two to three 
inches, you're referring to the -
THE WITNESS: The blade. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. 
Q (BY MR. HARMON) Okay. And these weren't unusual in 
appearance, I take it? 
A No. They were just the kind you buy and people 
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carry around. 
Q Okay. And like a father would give to his son as 
the boy's growing up? Something like that? 
Anybody carries them. A 
Q Okay. And what do people usually use those type of 
knives for? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Just about anything that you cut with -
Okay. 
- and do handiwork with, whatever. 
So it may be a utility tool, rather than a 
dangerous weapon? 
A Well, they're a dangerous weapon. If you got 
stabbed with one of those, they could do damage. 
Q But that would be - the same would be true of a 
mini screwdrivers and things like that? 
A Well, yeah. And these are knives. So they're a 
little bit different than a screwdriver. 
Q Was there ever any indication that the defendant 
intended to use them for any criminal purpose? 
A They were in the glove box. I don't - or in the 
console. So I don't know what his ultimate intention were 
with them. 
Q Okay. Would these be t he type of knife that a 
person would be advised to carry apart of - as part of his 
emergency equipment in his vehicle? 
'----------·------- --· --------·-····-·--··· 
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A I don't know. You can use them, you know, to cut 
stuff with. 
Q And you may use those as a part of your emergency 
equipment? 
A You can, yes. 
Q Okay. You - was the basis for doing the field 
sobriety tests what you felt was his jittery and his jittery 
movements? 
A Yes. When I first walked up to the car, I saw it. 
And then when I ran him, that kind of added to my suspicions. 
Q 
before? 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay . You - had you ever seen the defendant 
Not that I remeIT~er. 
Did you know anything at all about him? 
Not - well, I - only what I found out on my 
investiga t ion when I ran him. 
C Okay. Was there any of that that would indicate 
that you should do the field sobriety tests when you did your 
background check on him? 
A Well, he had drug charges, but that just added to 
my suspicions. '.!'hat \vasn 't the r-easo:-' i: did it. 
And tel1 us again w:iat the reason for doing . +-] ~ was. 
.A Hi s jit ter y movements, his rapid speech, and it 
appeared that he was, like I said, he was on - what I thought 
he could have been under s t imulants. 
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1 Q Okay. 
2 A Cause based on all the people I 2.rrest for 
3 stim~lants and dealt with, he was - it made me thi~~ so. 
4 Q Now, you did the blood draw and had that examined; 
5 is that right? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And did that show that he was negative for illicit 
8 drugs in his system? 
9 A No. He was oositive for something. I don't have 
10 it with me, but I don't recall what it was. 
11 Q Okay. Did he prod~ce ~or you a prescription from a 
12 physician in California showing that he had medical 
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A He said he had a medical marijuana card, but 
they're not valid in Utah . 
Q Okay. Tell me what your policy is now as you - as 
a law enforcement officer as you've discussed this question 
of medical marijuana and people driving on the freeway from 
California? 
A It's not va!id i ::1 Utah. So we're - we treat them 
j~st like everybody else that possesses an i llegal controlled 
substa::ice. 
o:-<:a y. Did y,_,,_: :, ave a:-:y c cm ve r~;a.t:i on ·✓1ith him abo·.1t 
~he fac~ that h3ving a prescript~on for ~a~ijuana in 
Califor~ia doesn't al ~ow t1im to ~ rj_~g it in c o Utah? 
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A 
Q 
I believe= told him that that's not valid in Utah. 
Okay. And that still leads to a criminal charge 
the~,? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Even though he may have legally obtained it in 
California and have a legitimate, physical reason for the 
marijuana? 
That 's correct. 
Was the defendant cooperative with you? 
A 
Q 
A Up until I requested him to do the urine test, and 
then I had to get a warrant. 
Q Okay. And the only thing he asked for was that you 
do tha~ with a warrant? 
A Oh, he didn't say do a warrant. He just refused 
saying - he kept saying his rights were being violated. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay . 
I told him I was going to get a warrant. 
And you read the admonitions from the form? 
Yes. I read all three of them. 
Okay, and yo~ indica~ed that he did have a valid 
driver's license. Which state issued that? 
A. Utah. 
W~ e n yo~ oh~~inerl ~he sea ~ch warrant from Judqe 
Eyre, did you complete an affidavit to support the issuance 
of the warrant? 
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A I did. 
Q Was there ever a copy of that and the warrant left 
with the defendant? 
A Yes. I gave him the copy that he was suppose to 
have. 
Where was he when you gave that to him? Q 
A The jail. Actually, we were sitting in the little 
room there. 
(Inaudible conversation with client) 
Q (BY MR. HARMON) Officer, could I just go back over 
one thing with you? Where was the defendant when you first 
saw his vehicle? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Driving down the road. 
And what direction was he -
Northbound. 
And where were you? 
I believe I was sitting on the side of the road. 
And which side? 
A The right side on the shoulder, cause I had just 
stopped another car and finished up with them. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. Were you southbound at that time? 
No. I was northbound. 
So - and were you stationary when the defendant 
passed you? 
A Yes. I was - like I said, I was sitting on the 
31 
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1 shoulder. I believe I had just finished a stop. 
2 Q Okay. And why was it that you stopped the 
3 defendant? 
4 A Why? 
5 Q Yes. 
6 A When he came by, like I said, California plates are 
7 really visible. So when he come by, I could see that the 
8 st i cker wasn't there. 
9 Q And that's why you were working on the other side? 
10 A Well, I had already completed that. I was just 
11 sitting there. 
12 Q Okay. 
13 A l believe I was getting ready to come back out on 
• 
14 t h e road. 
15 Q Okay. Did the fact that the car was licensed in 
16 California have anything to do with you stopping it? 
17 A No. I stop cars from a:1 the states. So it 
1 8 doesn 't matter. 
19 Q How about the fact that the defendant was Hispanic? I 
2 0 A No. That doesn't ha ve a n ything to do with it. I 
21 look for vio la tion s . I don't l ook for what race people are 
22 wh en t he y come b y. 11 
? l p·r,FJ:1rl ih ·1 e conv ersation with client) 
2 4 Q (BY VR. HARMON) Was t here a kind of recording made 
25 of this stop - an aud i o or a visua l -
I 32 
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A 
Q 
A 
I believe so. 
Okay. Do you know where that is now? 
It would be in the locker with all the other ones 
if it's there. 
Q Has that been provided for the county attorneys 
office? 
A Not yet . 
MR. HARMON: I think that's all the questions we 
have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harmon. 
Anything further? 
MS. HOWARD: Nothing further . 
THE COURT: Ms. Howard? 
MS. HOWARD: The State rests. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. Is there 
any other evidence we're going to be seeking today? 
MR. HARMON: The defendant will submit, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Does -
MR. HARMON: We do have some requests, however, 
though. We - there is the recording that was made of this, 
and we'd like to get a copy of that. 
THE COURT: I was just going to address a couple of 
questions that came to my mind. Many times in these types of 
motions, we have an evidentiary hearing, and then the 
parties, based on the evidence, sometimes like to submit a 
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brief. In this case, it sounds like you have certain amo~nts 
of evidence, but there may be additional evidence that may be 
requested, if it's available. I was wondering if you wanted 
me to simply make rulings based on what I've heard, or if you 
intended to brief ~his before I make a decision. 
MR. HA~MON: I'd like to brief it, Your Honor, and 
these are the things I'd like to go through in doing that so 
that the defendant will be satisfied that we've done an 
adequate job. I would like to have my secretary make a 
transcript of this hearing so we have that testimony. I 
would like to get the video recording so that we can review 
that. And then once I have those items, then we would like 
to be able to submit a brief on the matter, Your Honor. And 
considering what I think of the time it will take us to get 
that accomplished, we'd like to have it so that we would 
submit our brief in 30 days. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask this. Because based 
or. the informa tion I heard during the testimony, I wasn't 
clear i~ we're looking for a video recording, or an audio 
recording, or both? 
D8FF NDANT M:Z\KT TNF:6- CAS'l'ELLANOS: Both. 
THE C'.JURT: T' m wai t . .:i.n g for the officer to indicate 
M~. SHESTS: On the camera. 
THE COU~T: So it's a video/audio recording? 
34 
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MR. SHEETS : Yes . 
THE COURT: On a single tape? 
MR. SHEETS : Well, I' ll have to -
THE COURT: It's a single recording? 
MR. SHEETS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You didn't have a mic on your shoulder 
that was recording? 
MR. SHEETS: No. We have one of these little mies 
on our belt. 
THE COURT: So you have - is that in conjunction 
with the video camera of the car? 
MR. SHEETS: Yes. Everything's on it . 
THE COURT: Okay. So everything is on one tape? 
MR. SHEETS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. So the request is, if that tape 
can be located -
MR. HARMON: Yes. 
THE COURT: - can it be provided? And I need to 
know from counsel how long it would take to do that? 
MS. HOWARD: I'm sure they could have it to Mr. 
Harmon by Monday. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then I think within 30 days is a 
reasonable time for Mr. Harmon to provide us with a copy - or 
of his brief on this matter, his memorandum, and Ms. Howard, 
how long would you need after you receive his to reply? 
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MS. HOWARD: I wouldn't need very long, Your Honor. 
If we can have two weeks? 
THE COURT: That would be fine. 
Mr. Harmon, if you could have yours prepared and 
submitted by November 30 th ? 
Then, Ms. Howard, if we could have yours by 
December 15 th , then I can consider the matter after that. 
Is there anything further that we can accomplish on 
this case today, counsel? 
MS. HOWARD: I don't have anything further. 
MR. HARMON: Yeah. I think that's -
THE COURT: Then let me do this. I'm going to ask 
my clerk to pull the file and notify me after November 30th 
just so that I can see if we have documents. I don't want 
the case to linger or to be forgotten~ And unfortunately, in 
our criminal processes, we go from motion filing to 
evidentiary hearing and then sometimes we don't have a bump 
date by which to make sure that it comes back up on my 
calendar. If we don't have the memorandum by November 30 th , 
I'm going to call for an oral argument type presentation by 
counsel some time in December. I would prefer to give you an 
opportunity to present things in writing. But if we don't 
have it by the deadlines established, then I'll simply set a 
hearing date so that we can have an oral argument and a 
decision. 
36 
------------·------···-~---------------- -----------
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
t 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
MS. HOWARD: Okay . 
THE COURT: You need to talk to your attorney, and 
I'll respond to him. 
MS. HOWARD: I will leave the evidence - the 
exhibits with you, Your Honor. If you'd like to have those 
through the motions hearing? 
THE COURT: Thank you. I would. Either party can 
have access to the file if they have questions about what's 
9 in the file, and a copy of the transcript should - I mean, a 
10 copy of the recording of this hearing shouldn't be any 
11 · problem for either party to get a copy of if they feel they'd 
12 like too . 
13 Mr. Harmon, is there anything else we need to 
14 address today? 
15 MR. HARMON: No, Your Honor . 
16 THE COURT: Thank you then. That'll be the order of 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the court. 
MS. HOWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
--- -···--·--··-···----·--------
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STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
·f ll[O IN 
ij TH DIS T~!Ci-:ceu,n 
ST!·. TE OF UT AH 
J!Jt, :: COUNT'( 
12 N0V-8 PH L,: 3Bc<t' 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
JUAB COUNTY 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON COURT'S 
SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION OF 
Plaintiff, GRANTING DEFENDANT 
ANEW TRIAL 
ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 101600146 
Judge James Brady 
This matter came before the court for jury trial on November l, 2012. The jury trial 
resulted in a conviction of the defendant on counts 1,2 4, and 5, and the dismissal of count 3 of 
the information. One week following the trial, the court met with counsel for both parties in 
chambers to notify the parties that the court is concerned with a question of whether any error or 
impropriety occurred in this case which may have had a substantial adverse effect on the rights of 
the defendant as is contemplated by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Specifically, expressed concern whether defendant received effective assistance of counsel. This 
concern is based solely on the court's own considerations of two events in the history of this 
case. 1) Defense counsel's failure to file any memorandum following an evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress; and 2) Defense counsel's failure to challenge or remove a 
potentially biased juror from the jury on the day of trial. 
Without coming to a conclusion on the final issue presented in the motion to suppress, the 
court notes that based on the testimony elicited at trial, there is at least an arguable basis to have 
pursued defendant's motion to suppress, which defense counsel failed to do . 
The court is also concerned that a prospective juror who may have a bias was ultimately 
allowed to remain on the jury to hear and decide the case. The court's concern for potential bias 
is based on the juror's many years working as a highway patrolman, his prior involvement in 
numerous interdiction cases with facts similar to the case being tried, and/or his brief prior 
association with the State's only witness who is a current highway patrolman, 
The court sets a hearing on December 20, 2012 at I l :ao A_.m. at which time it will 
hear argument from counsel on the question of whether any error or impropriety occurred in this 
case which may have had a substantial adverse effect on the rights of the defendant, as 
contemplated by Rule 24 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure . 
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Dated this£ day of November, 2012. 
BY THE COURT: 
~~~-
Judge James Brady "cs:= 
• 
• 
• 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 101600146 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
BY HAND: JARED W ELDRIDGE 
BY HAND: MILTON T HARMON 
11/08/2012 
Date: 
Printed: 11/08/12 16:34:17 
/s/ CINDY JACQUART 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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